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FINALITY IN INDIAN TRIBUNAL DECISIONS:
RESPECTING OUR BROTHERS' VISION
Michael M. Pacheco*
The white man is greedy, demanding [and] shrewd,
but sees only what he wants to see and accordingly
misses rather a lot.'
Introduction
The demise of tribal self-governance2 for American Indians
began with the white man's success in securing treaties early in
American history.3 Those treaties became, in large part, the
launching pad for an endless debate on the status of Indians in
white American society.4 By reducing the entirety of Indians'
rights to a "bundle of rights" contained wholly within the
boundaries of a treaty, the next step in eroding Indian self-
government was to simply abrogate the treaty.
The many attitudes towards Indians have found expression in
an array of inconsistent judicial cases and scholarly opinions, 5
some justifying the treatment of American Indians as less than
* Clerk, Office of the Attorney General, State of Oregon. J.D., 1990, Willamette
University; B.A., 1975, Gonzaga University.
I. R. CoLns, EsKudos, CmcANos, INDmNs 526 (1977). Coles is a Pulitzer prize-
winning author.
2. Self-government has been described by the United States Supreme Court as the
highest and best of all among the arts of civilized life. According to Justice Matthews,
self-government for Indians includes "the regulation by themselves of their own domestic
affairs, [and] the maintenance of order and peace among their own members by the
administration of their own laws and customs." Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 568
(1883).
3. It is arguable, of course, that the demise actually began shortly after Columbus
landed in the New World. His sending of 500 Indian slaves to Spain occurred within
only three years of Europe's "discovery" of the New World. See Williams, The Medieval
and Renaissance Origins of the Status of the American Indian in Western Legal Thought,
57 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 37 n.147 (1983) (citing T. FLOYD, THE COLUmBUS DYNASTY IN
Tim CARmBEAN 1492-1526, at 28 (1973)).
4. See, e.g., Indian Law Resource Center, United States Denial of Indian Property
Rights: A Study in Lawless Power and Racial Discrimination, in Rnrmmo INDIAN
LAW 15 (1982) (noting unrestrained federal power over Indians was not part of the law
during the nation's infancy and that treaties would have been meaningless if such were
the case).
5. See, e.g., infra note 109 and accompanying text.
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equals to white Americans, 6 which in turn purported to justify
the subsequent breaking of the original treaties. 7 Although it is
clear that Indians are treated uniquely in the United States
Constitution, it is not as clear that it was due to an acknow-
led gment of tribes as political entities with whom the Founding
Fathers felt a need to negotiate. Yet, when an Indian tribunal
decides a case today, the value and justness of the decision are
evaluated by non-Indians according to white American jurispru-
deritial principles and not the Indians' own order of reason. 8
This is not intended as a statement of contumacy but rather an
avowal of white society's single-minded vision.
This article examines the gradual erosion of Indian sovereignty
and the concept of Indian self-government. 9 First, the article
overviews the historical development of the Discovery Doctrine °
and how the doctrine set the tone for the rationalizing process
that followed it. Second, the modern-era judicial cases leading
up to and those interpreting the Indian Civil Rights Act" are
examined to demonstrate their limiting effect on the scope of
tribal governments' sovereignty and powers. The third section
addresses the traditional and current method of maintaining the
white man's vision as the standard by which to measure the
6. It is convenient to baldly assert that Indians have special rights and receive
special treatment by the federal government. But one writer notes
[a]ny American who has been on an Indian reservation knows very well
that Indians are not "equal." The highest infant mortality rate and lowest
life expectancy in the country reflect massive unmet health needs. Family
income by far is the lowest in the nation. Housing and education deficits
are greater than in any other sector of our society .... It is ironic, and
brutally so, that there are those who would claim that the Indians are
"favored" or "more than equal."
Wilkinson, Several Myths Muddy Understanding of Indian Fishing Dispute, OREoON J.,
July 20, 1976, at 10.
7. Treaty-making ended by congressional action on March 3, 1871. This law,
however, did not impair the obligations of any treaty lawfully made before that date.
See 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1982).
8. For a similar perspective, see de Raismes, The Indian Civil'Rights Act of 1968
and the Pursuit of Responsible Tribal Self-Government, 20 S.D.L. Rnv. 59 (1975).
9. Self-government in this context refers to tribal government. Historically, the
idea of joint action or a confederacy of tribes was foreign to American Indians. Thus,
one writer notes that "instead of presenting a unified front against European intruders
they allowed themselves to be isolated and defeated tribe by tribe." D. WoRcasTBR,
Foa:EID TONGUES AND BROKEN TR.ATins xvi (1975). For examples of exceptions, see 15
HANoBooK op NoRTH AmAucAN INDIANs 418-41 (1978).
10. The doctrine is based on the principle "that discovery gave title to the govern-
ment by whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was made ... ." Johnson v.
M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
11. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1982). See infra note 107 for the text of the act.
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value of competing public policies and goals in the American
judicial process. The last section of the article and the conclusion
suggest that we should create a separate Federal Indian Court
of Appeals comprised solely of Native Americans. The sugges-
tion is based on the premise that only by considering and
respecting the uniqueness of each tribe and its heritage can
American federal courts administer true justice.
12
Development of the Discovery Doctrine and its Progeny
The Discovery Doctrine
The Discovery Doctrine was first articulated by Chief Justice
John Marshall in Johnson v. M'Intosh,1 3 wherein a group of
non-Indian plaintiffs claimed title to land which they had bought
directly from the Illinois and Piankeshaw Indian Nations. The
defendant claimed title to the same land, basing his ownership
on a subsequent purchase from the United States. The defendant
argued that the Indian Nations had ceded the disputed land to
the United States by treaty; thus, the federal government owned
the land and was free to sell it. 14
As some scholars have noted, Chief Justice Marshall strained
to justify America's invasion of a native peoples' land, by setting
forth an asserted right to impose upon the Indians a European-
derived form of subjugation. 5 This right ostensibly resulted from
the discovery of land in the New World. Yet, even by the time
of the seventeenth century, it was not clear "whether the term
'discovery' meant more than the mere finding of the lands
previously unknown to European civilization. 1' 6 According to
Marshall, discovery gave to the European discoverer "an exclu-
sive right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by
purchase or by conquest.' 7 Marshall added that the rights of
the Indians, though not entirely disregarded, were considerably
12. A similar argument with regard to uniqueness of subject matter was made in
the patent law area in justifying the creation and existence of the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit. See generally Note, An Appraisal of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, 57 S. CAL. L. Ray. 301 (1984).
13. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 543.
14. Id. at 572. The defendant argued that the "later in time" treaty cession to the
United States gave a title superior to the "earlier in time" sale of the same land to
plaintiffs.
15. See, e.g., D. GarcaBs, C. WILKINsoN, FEDERAL INDmAN LAW 37 (2d ed. 1986)
[hereinafter FEDERAL INDrm LAW].
16. W. BisHoP, JR., INERNATiONAL LAw: CAsEs AND MA..mA.s 272 (1953).
17. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 587.
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impaired. In his view, "[t]heir power to dispose of the soil at
thefx own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the
original fundamental principle, that discovery gave exclusive title
to those who made it."18 Therefore, the Johnson Court held
that the plaintiff's title was not one cognizable in a United States
federal court, because discovery had divested the Indian nations
of their power to convey their lands to anyone other than the
discoverer or its successor, the United States of America. The
decision thereby effectively stripped the Indian Nations of legal
title to their own homelands.1 9
Justice Marshall further refined his concept of the American
Indians' legal status in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.20 In this
case the Cherokee Nation sought to prevent the state of Georgia
from encroaching upon land recognized by treaty with the United
States. 2' Basing his decision upon the then-accepted discovery
doctrine, Marshall surmised that Indians were merely "wards"
of the United States and not independent, foreign nations.2
Instead, he concluded that the Indian Nations were "dependent
domestic nations" which could be controlled only by the United
States and not the state of Georgia.2 Thus, Marshall reinforced
the idea that these "savages," who were "in a state of pupil-
age," 24 had no external powers beyond their boundaries; because
the Cherokee Nation was not a foreign state in a controversy
of the sort which the framers of the Constitution had contem-
plated, the suit was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 2
18. Id. at 573-74.
19. Id. at 604-05. See also Berman, The Concept of Aboriginal Title in the Early
History of the United States, 27 BuFFAo L. Ray. 637 (1978). For white Americans to
inhabit a territory cooperatively "was apparently beyond the scope of the 17th century
English thought. The result is an Anglo-American legal system with an inherent cultural
bias that attributes an anomalous and inferior status to non-European forms of land
tenure." Id. at 644 n.31.
20. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
21. See generally Burke, The CherokeeeCases: A Study in Law, Politics and
Morality, 21 STA. L. REv. 500 (1969).
22. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 17.
25. Id. at 18. One commentator noted the lasting effects of Marshall's opinion in
Cherokee Nation:
The Doctrine of Discovery, the primordial mythic icon of Europe's imperial
past, had been preserved and brought to readability in a form which spoke
with reassuring continuity to a nation about to embark on its own colonial
vision quest; a quest which would seek to determine whose vision of life
would prevail on the American continent.
Willians, The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and
Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 219, 258.
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Worcester v. Georgia2 6 appears to be the first instance where
the Court questioned the discovery theory. In Worcester a white
man, Samuel Worcester, was charged with "residing within the
limits of the Cherokee nation without a license" required by the
state of Georgia and "without having taken the oath to support
and defend the constitution and laws of the state of Georgia." 27
Worcester was found guilty by a Georgia court and was sen-
tenced to hard labor for four years in a Georgia penitentiary.2
He appealed to the United States Supreme Court, challenging
the jurisdiction of the state of Georgia in the Cherokee Nation.
Justice Marshall wrote in great detail to explain the "national
character of the Cherokees"29 and the relationship between the
Cherokees and the United States resulting from the Treaty of
Hopewell of 1785. In the end, Marshall made clear that he was
not departing from his earlier pronouncements on the status of
American Indians:
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community,
occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately
described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no
force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right
to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees them-
selves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the
acts of congress.30
Thus, the law of the state of Georgia condemning Worcester
to hard labor was deemed void, and the judgment was accord-
ingly reversed. 31
In concurring with Marshall, Justice McLean noted that "in
the executive, legislative and judicial branches of our government
we have admitted, by the most solemn sanction, the existence
of the Indians as a separate and distinct people, and as being
vested with rights which constitute them a state or separate
community. ' 32 Such a community, McLean reasoned, can be so
surrounded by a white population that it would be impossible
to treat the tribe as being under federal law. Under those
26. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
27. Id. at 528-29.
28. Id. at 532.
29. One writer suggests that Cherokee tnbal sovereignty is what rendered Georgia
law invalid. See Waiters, Preemption, Tribal Sovereignty, and Worcester v. Georgia, 62
OR. L. Rav. 127 (1983).
30. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 560.
31. Id. at 561-62.
32. Id. at 583 (McLean, J., concurring).
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circumstances, he argued, the practical solution is to apply state
law.
]In essence, McLean was stating that federal power over In-
dians was not applicable in all cases.33 His restrictive view of
national power, however, did not become the consensus view of
the Court in the years that followed. 4
Removal, Reservations and Assimilation
JIt is significant to note that the Marshall "trilogy" of cases
took place during the Jacksonian period in American history
when Indians were forcibly removed from their homelands. The
infamous "Trail of Tears" left by the Five Civilized Tribes
(Cherokee, Choctaw, Creek, Chickasaw, and Seminole) from
Georgia to Oklahoma occurred during President Andrew Jack-
sort's administration. Jackson favored the removal and reloca-
tion of Indians; thus, he lent political support for states like
Georgia to flatly disobey rulings by the Supreme Court. He is
credited with saying in regard to the Worcester case: "Marshall
has made his law, now let him enforce it."" s
Since Worcester, review of state court decisions by federal
courts has become the primary method of protecting tribal
sovereignty. 6 As one might expect, the protection of tribal
sovereignty was not without its limits. In Ex parte Crow Dog37
the alleged murder of one Sioux by another was found outside
the criminal jurisdiction of the United States Territorial Court
33. This was not a new position for Justice McLean. Previously, as a circuit judge,
he had expressed the same views in United States v. Cisna, 25 Fed. Cas. 422, 424
(C.C.D. Ohio 1835) (No. 14,795) and United States v. Bailey, 24 Fed. Cas. 937 (C.C.
Tem. 1834) (No. 14,495).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (congressional power
upheld); Cohen, Indian Rights and the Federal Courts, 24 MinN. L. Rav. 145, 149
(1940) (noting Marshall's analysis consistently followed). See also Lone Wolf v. Hitch-
cock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (federal sale of tribal land upheld).
35. See generally V. DELoRIA, JR. & C. Lynxa, AmmucAN INDIAms, AmmEPCAN
JUSTrCE 6-7 (1983) [hereinafter DELoRiA]. See also F. PRucHA, INDiAN PoLicy IN TH
UNimD STATES, H=srowICAL EssAYs 138-52 (1981). In the cited essay, noted historian
Francis Paul Prucha makes an interesting attempt to understand Jackson's endorsement
of his Indian removal policy. Prucha's stated purpose in writing the essay "was to
examine the removal policy in the perspective of the times in which it was adopted."
Id. at 138. However, his conclusion that in assessing Jackson's Indian policy, contem-
porary critics and historians "have certainly been too harsh, if not, indeed, quite
wrong," is clearly subject to debate.
36. See de Raismes, supra note 8, at 61. See also Note, Tribal Self-Government
and the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 70 MiCH. L. REv. 955 (1972) [hereinafter
Tribal Self-Government]; S. BRA=, AmmucA INDL4N TRmAL CouRTs: THE CosTs ov
SEPARATE JUSTICE 6 (1978).
37. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
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of Dakota. The holding caused a furor among neighboring non-
Indians.3" The furor led to the passage of the Major Crimes Act
of 1885,19 which gave the federal courts original jurisdiction over
crimes such as murder, rape, burglary, arson, larceny, and
assault with intent to kill. Such jurisdiction applied, however,
only when the crime was committed in "Indian country" by
one Indian against another.40 Recently, there has been growing
support for the argument that these "exclusive" jurisdiction
crimes should be handled by the tribes under a "concurrent
power" theory.
41
In 1883, the same year Crow Dog was decided, Congress
established the Courts of Indian Offenses in an effort to provide
law and order on Indian reservations. 42 Their creation, however,
proved to provide only illusory justice for American Indians.
The lessons of events such as the tragic removal of Indians from
their homelands onto reservations should have taught the in-
appropriateness of white law when applied to Indians. On the
other hand, the Courts of Indian Offenses may have been viewed
at the time as a shrewd (though insensitive) method of eroding
still further the inherent powers of a tribe. Such was the result
in United States v. Clapox,43 in which the district court in Oregon
characterized the new courts as educational and disciplinary
instrumentalities with the purported purpose of "civilizing" the
Indians. 44 The idea of civilizing the "savage" Indian led the
white man to his next logical step in the attempt "to make them
like us."'45
38. See, e.g., Tribal Self-Government, supra note 36, at 957.
39. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 385, as amended, 18 U.S.C. §
1153, 3242 (1982).
40. Id.
41. S. BRAm, supra note 36, at 8.
42. See 25 C.F.R. § 11.1-.306 (1982). The Bureau of Indian Affairs selected and
paid the judges and police for these courts, thus rendering the courts mere instruments
of the Bureau. The goal was "to fill the void caused by declines in traditional authority
and to reduce the remaining power of traditional chiefs by creating a competing center
of authority." F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDEAL INDLN LAW 333 (1982 ed.).
43. 35 F. Cas. 575 (D. Or. 1888).
44. Id. at 577.
45. Felix Cohen notes that the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in 1889 reflected
this attitude in his assertion that 'It]he American Indian is to become the Indian
American." F. CoHEN, supra note 42, at 139 (quoting COMM'R IND. AmF. Am. REP.,
H.R. Exec. Doc. No.1, 51st Cong., 2d Sess. at vi (1890)). Cohen's handbook has been
called "one of the greatest treatises in all the law; like Blackstone, [Cohen] sorted,
analysed, and compiled a mass of previously diffuse authorities in order to give Indian
law a center. It became, in Justice Frankfurter's words, 'an acknowledged guide for
the Supreme Court in Indian litigation."' FEmEAL INDLt LAW, supra note 15, at 137
(citing F. FRANKRTE, OF LAW A AND Lm AND OrHR TINGs THAT MATTa 143
(1967)).
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In principle, the allotment of lands to Indians in 1887 was
supposed to provide the opportunity for Indian prosperity. It
was believed that ownership of a tract of land somehow would
transform and assimilate the Indian into the mainstream of white
American culture. The actual impact of allotment was that it
broke up communal ownership of land by conveying individual
allotments to allottees, and by ceding or selling the "surplus"
land to first the United States and then non-Indians. Not sur-
prisingly, the allotment system was a failure. As Judge William
Canby notes: "[In much of the country the long-range effect
of the [Dawes] Act was to separate Indians from their lands
without accomplishing any of the benign purposes intended by
the Act's sponsors."' '
Reorganization, Termination and Self-Determination
Following the failure of the allotment system and the attempt
to change the Indian by assimilation, white American attitudes
in Indian policy took on a different hue. Tribalism and the idea
of self-government received greater tolerance and "even some
respect, for many traditional aspects of Indian culture. ' 47 This
new, ostensibly beneficent change in direction was successful in
blocking passage of several bills that would have further reduced
Indian land holdings.4
The new policy also led to passage of the Leavitt Act of
1932,49 which authorized the Secretary of the Interior to adjust
or discharge debts in which Indians had been gouged by white
contractors. One year later John Collier, an active reformist in
the Indian movement, was appointed Commissioner of Indian
Affairs."0 As a result of Collier's efforts to preserve Indian
heritage and to revive tribalism, Congress passed the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA).
5'
46. W. CANBY, AEmicAN INDLA. LAW 22 (1988). Cohen notes that [o]f the
approximately 156 million acres of Indian lands in 1881, less than 105 million remained
by 1890, and 78 million by 1900. Indian land holdings were reduced from 138 million
in 1887 to 48 million in 1934, a loss of 90 million acres. Of this, about 27 million
acres, or two thirds of the total land allotted, passed from Indian allottees by sale
between 1887 and 1934. An additional 60 million acres were either ceded outright or
sold to non-Indian homesteaders and corporations as "surplus" lands.
F. CoEN, supra note 42, at 138.
47. F. CoHEN, supra note 42, at 144.
48. Id.
49. Ch. 369, 47 Stat. 564 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 386a (1982)).
50. F. CoHEN, supra note 42, at 146 (citing K. ProeP, JoHN COLLIR's CRUSADE
FoR 'NDIANO PEFORM 1920-1954 at 24 (1977); A. DEBO, A HISTORY OF TmE INDIANS OF
TE UMTED STATES 338 (1970)).
51. Ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1982)).
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The IRA was intended to halt the alienation of tribal lands
so that the economic condition of Indians could improve. Under
the IRA, tribes were permitted to politically organize, following
non-Indian governmental norms, to form business corporations,
and to receive preference in federal employment. The IRA also
gave power to the Secretary to promulgate conservation regu-
lations and to exempt certain acquisitions of land from taxa-
tion. 2 Still, the IRA had its deficiencies.
In actuality, the supervisory role of the federal government
was probably enlarged to a greater degree than the self-govern-
ment of the Indians. This is evidenced, for example, by the
Indian tribes' limited autonomy, 53 embodied in the requirement
of congressional sanction before the adoption of an Indian
constitution. Although a few tribes did in fact revive or establish
some form of tribal government, many remained either unor-
ganized or under existing tribal governments. 54 All things con-
sidered, "[p]rogress toward the strong tribal self-government
that John Collier and the IRA encouraged was slow but, many
believe, significant." 55
Toward the end of World War II, "the tenor of the times
was beginning to run against further Indian renaissance. '56 At-
tacks on reforms brought about by the IRA became increasingly
hostile during the 1940s.57 The attacks came from a diverse and
"strange coalition of forces [which] now called for the unilateral
termination of federal assistance to Indians .... "158 Conserva-
tives wanted federal budget cuts. Liberals wanted anti-discrimi-
nation legislation. Many others wanted a stronger focus on
international affairs and the war effort.59 Keeping in step with
traditional white politics, these attacks served "as vehicles for
noisy criticism.' '
52. F. CoHEN, supra note 42, at 148-49.
53. See Tribal Self-Government, supra note 36, at 966-69.
54. Kelly, Indian Adjustment and the History of Indian Affairs, 10 Asiz. L. Rnv.
559, 569 (1968). See also de Raismes, supra note 8, at 69. "Today there are approximately
250 Indian tribes with identifiable governments; 95 of these have constitutions written
in conformity with the Indian Reorganization Act." Id. (citing Kerr, Constitutional
Rights, Tribal Justice and the American Indian, 18 J. PuB. L. 311, 316 (1969).
55. F. COHEN, supra note 42, at 151.
56. DELomA, supra note 35, at 16.
57. See generally S. TYLER, INDuN AFspAw: A STUDY OF CHANGES 11 PoucY OF
THE UmTED STTs TowR INDINs (1964).
58. DELORIA, supra note 35, at 16.
59. F. COHEN, supra note 42, at 154; DELoRA, supra note 35, at 16-17.
60. D. McNciuE, THEY CAvE HERE FmsT 249 (1975).
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Between 1945 and 1950, federal budget cuts continued, re-
flec ting America's postwar faith in free enterprise. The termi-
nation policy61 in 1950 also brought the appointment of Dillon
S. Myer as Commissioner of Indian Affairs. Myer had been the
former director of the detention camp program for Japanese-
Americans during World War 11.62
During Myer's tenure, due in part to lobbying by Republican
Senator Arthur Watkins of Utah, two major tribes were legis-
latively terminated: the Klamath of Oregon and the Menominee
of Wisconsin. 63 Many smaller tribes were also terminated." Over-
all, however, "the large tribes with treaty commitments and
political sophistication were not touched although they were
nearly frightened into submission."
65
The termination policy cut deeply into Indian culture. As
usual, the consent of those governed by the termination legis-
61. Termination meant denial of federal education, health, welfare and housing
assistance as well as other social programs. Termination also meant the imposition of
state legislative and judicial jurisdiction over terminated Indians resulting in the inap-
plicability of federal and tribal law. Most of the termination legislation had such common
provisions as: 1) the requirement of completion of the termination process within two
to five years, 2) preparation of final tribal rolls during that time, 3) members on the
rolls were to be given a personal property right in individual tribal assets and 4) the
Secretary of the Interior was to publish a proclamation announcing final termination.
See generally Wilkinson & Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 Am.
INDIAN L. Ray, 139 (1977).
62. F. CoHEN, supra note 42, at 158.
63. DELoalA, supra note 35, at 18.
64. See, e.g., F. ComN, supra note 42, at 173-74 nn.224-37. In addition to the
Klamath and Menominee tribes, the following tribes were also terminated:
Indian Tribe State Population Acres
Western Oregon
(61 tribes) Oregon 2,081 3,158
Alabama-Coushatta Texas 450 3,200
Mixed-blood Ute Utah 490 211,430
Southern Paiute Utah 232 42,839
Wyandotte Oklahoma 1,157 94
Peoria Oklahoma 640 0
Ottawa Oklahoma 630 0
California Rancherias California 1,107 4,315
Catawba S. Carolina 631 3,388
Ponca Nebraska 442 834
2 F. PRucHA, THE GREAT FATHER, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND TH AMERICAN
INDIAN 1048 (1984) (citations omitted). In all, "approximately 109 tribes and bands
were terminated. A minimum of [1,362,801] acres and [13,263] individuals were af-
fected." Wilkinson & Biggs, supra note 61, at 151.
65. DELoRA, supra note 35, at 18.
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lation was not considered necessary for its implementation.6
Critics of the policy note that tribal sovereignty and the trust
relationship were effectively ended 67 during this dark period in
American history.
Although the Handbook of Federal Indian Law states that
coercive termination as a policy was abandoned in 1958,68 other
authorities suggest that "a persistent strain of opposition to
termination remained strong throughout the period when it was
the official policy of Congress." 69 The move away from termi-
nation as a solution to Indian "problems" was clear in 1960 by
the pro-self-determination positions of both Richard Nixon and
John Kennedy.70 Characteristic of the change in political winds,
President Johnson, in addressing Congress in 1968, proposed
"a new goal for our Indian programs; a goal that ends the old
debate about termination and stresses self-determination."
'7'
Such was the state of affairs on the pendulum of white
America's Indian policy. The red man had gone through a series
of characterizations by his white neighbor: from "savage hea-
then" to "potential prosperous farmer," from a race to be
"terminated" to a tribe determining its own destiny. The Indian
remains today as unique as he was in the days of John Mar-
shall.72
During the century that followed the Worcester case, federal
courts generally paid substantial deference to the doctrine of
tribal sovereignty. 73 Yet, with the passing years, it became evi-
dent that since Indians were citizens of both the United States 4
66. RED MA 's LAND, infra note 112, at 91.
67. See Wilkinson & Biggs, supra note 61.
68. F. COHEN, supra note 42, at 180.
69. DEOI IA, supra note 35, at 21. For a general summary of federal government
policy toward Indian sovereignty, see K. KIcKINGBmD, L. KICKINGBnED, C. Cmnrrry &
C. BERKEY, INDIAN SovaEmo GTY (1983).
70. F. CoHna, supra note 42, at 182.
71. DEOaRA, supra note 35, at 22.
72. Indians today continue to be stereotyped and categorized. Melanie Smith-
Walking Bull (Santee-Dakota), acting director of a health foundation for Indians notes
that "[i]f you're a Native American, then people assume you get a big, fat check every
month that's sufficient to take care of your needs. The reality is that most Native
Americans are still living on subsistence wages or incomes." Sylwester, Indians Find
Aid, Culture, Community at Salem House, Statesman J., Feb. 18, 1990 (Salem, Or.),
at IC, col. 4. See also F. SHIPEK, PusanD INTo THE RocKs 152-53 (1987) ("Problems
continue to exist because of the stereotyped views [we have] of Indians .... ).
73. See, e.g., Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896) (Cherokee powers of self-
government not operated upon by fifth amendment).
74. See Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1401(b) (1982)); Johnson, Sovereignty, Citizenship and the American Indians, 15 Amz.
L. REv. 973 (1973).
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and of the states in which they lived, 75 federal courts eventually
would have to more clearly define where the Indian stood with
respect to fundamental rights and liberties under the Constitu-
tioln. 76 The imposed authority of the federal government to
define such rights was obviously a giant leap from the "sovereign
tribes" perspective of the Worcester era to the more current
view of tribal governments and courts as being within the federal
legal and governmental structure.
The Jurisdiction Cases and Tribal Sovereignty
The Intrusive Power of Appellate Review
The Ninth Circuit was faced with a question of individual
Indian constitutional rights in Colliflower v. Garland.77 In that
case, Madeline Colliflower was charged with and found guilty
of disobeying "a lawful order of the [Indian] Court by failing
to remove her cattle from land leased by another person, after
being ordered to do so by the [Indian] Court .... ,"78 She was
senftenced to a fine of $25 or five days in jail. Because she could
not afford to pay the fine, Mrs. Colliflower elected to serve the
jail sentence.
In her petition to the United States District Court, she alleged
a denial by the tribal government of her rights to counsel, trial,
and confrontation of witnesses. She also sought a writ of habeas
corpus. The district court denied the petition for lack of
jurisdiction79 and Mrs. Colliflower appealed to the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals. The appellate court addressed only the ques-
tion. of whether the district court had jurisdiction to issue a writ
of habeas corpus. 0
75. See Goodluck v. Apache County, 417 F. Supp. 13 (D. Ariz. 1975), aff'd sub
nom. Apache County v. United States, 429 U.S. 876 (1976) (holding that 14th amendment
protections apply to Indians).
76. See Lazarus, Title II of the 1968 Civil Rights Act: An Indian Bill of Rights,
45 N.D.L. Ray. 337, 341 (1969).
77. 342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965).
78. Id. at 370. Colliflower was a member of the Gros Ventre tribe whose court
she alleged violated her rights under the United States Constitution. The Gros Ventre
tribe is part of the Fort Belknap Indian community on the Indian reservation in Blaine
County, Montana.
79. United States constitutional guarantees expressly protect United States citizens
from state and federal governmental infringements of their rights but not from tribal
governments. See, e.g., U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV. Cohen suggests that "(a]n analogy
may be made to the so-called Insular Cases, holding that the Constitution does not
apply to newly acquired United States territory until Congress applies it by statute." F.
CoHm, supra note 42, at 664 n.11l.
80. Colliflower, 342 F.2d at 371.
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Finding that an Indian court is "in part, at least, [an] arm
of the federal government,""' the Ninth Circuit determined that
"it is competent for a federal court in a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding to inquire into the legality of the detention of an Indian
pursuant to an order of an Indian court. '8 2 Thus, the appeals
court broke new ground in the degree of federal intrusion into
tribal self-government. The reasoning of the court was based on
its assertion that Indian courts function in a manner similar to
federal agencies, and that they are under "partial control" of
the federal government. 3 As a result, the district court's order
denying the petition for habeas .corpus was reversed.8
In a fashion not unlike the Congress in 1885, the Ninth Circuit
in Colliflower took upon itself the task of defining the status
of Indians within the federal judicial structure. This, of course,
was also an indirect way of defining the status of the Indian
courts in that same structure. 5
Indian Courts as "Agencies"
By classifying and analogizing Indian courts to federal agen-
cies, the Ninth Circuit was assuring tribal courts a certain death.
Granted, under an agency concept Indian courts will exist and,
generally, courts will not decide an issue within the jurisdiction
of an Indian tribunal prior to a decision by that tribunal.8
However, any decision rendered by the tribal courts will be
constrained by judicially and legislatively established boundaries
on the tribal courts' discretion. Furthermore, tribal decisions
may be subject to de novo reviewY This is evidenced by the
treatment given to the Securities and Exchange Commission, the
81. Id. at 379.
82. Id.
83. Id. One critic suggests that despite the court's disclaimer that it did not "pass
upon the merits," id. at 379, the court actually did so: "What emerges from a close
reading of Colliflower ... is not a cohesive new theory of constitutional law, but rather
a distinct impression that the Court of Appeals found a gross injustice to have been
perpetrated and simply decided to stop it." Lazarus, supra note 76, at 344.
84. Colliflower, 342 F.2d at 379.
85. For a discussion on the extent to which courts can effectively legislate new law,
see Peck, Comments on Judicial Creativity, 69 IowA L. RFv. 1 (1983-84).
86. Note, The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction: Was It Inverted?, 2 PEPPERDINE
L. REv. 190 (1974). See generally NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111
(1944) (Congress intended NLRB to be primarily responsible for applying law).
87. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402
(1971). See also Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922) (held citizenship to be
jurisdictional fact, thus reviewing court should conduct trial de novo).
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Interstate Commerce Commission, and other like agencies of
the federal government. 8
It is true that, in many cases, deference is given to the fact-
finding of federal agencies.8 9 Legislative acts and court decisions
suggest that, in some instances, agencies may be experts in a
given area and thus be more aware than courts of the proper
resolution of a matter. For example, the Supreme Court has
stated that "in cases raising issues of fact not within the con-
ventional experience of judges or cases requiring the exercise of
adrdnistrative discretion, agencies created by Congress for reg-
ulating the subject matter should not be passed over .... "9o
On its face, the Court's statement seems clear, but in its appli-
cation to Indian tribunals, its breadth is unclear. Even the
Administrative Procedure Act is not very helpful "in directing
when the reviewing court is able (or required) to find the facts
de novo, without any deference to the agency's factual deter-
minations." 91 This muddies the waters for the practitioner, who
must predict the likelihood of the court substituting its judgment
for -that of the Indian "agency."
Arguably, under the agency concept, Indians seek to enforce
their rights pursuant to treaty agreements and thus, also, pur-
suant to a legislatively delegated power. Therefore, if one con-
siders treaties as approved enactments of Congress, 92 the treaties
should be handled by courts in the same manner as statutes-
requiring interpretive, statutory construction. Such construction,
of course, would require that the court use the same judicial
standards of the Indian tribal court. This follows from the fact
88. See Administrative Procedure Act, § 10 (e) (1946) (as amended at 5 U.S.C. §
706 (1982)). See also Medical Comm'n for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C.
Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972) (permitting review of agency's no-
action letter).
89. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938) (agency finding
on question of fact upheld if supported by "substantial evidence").
90. United States v. Western Pac. Ry., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956).
91. E. GE LHoRN & B. BoYER, ADmn, STRArE LAW AND PaocEss 74 (2d ed. 1981).
92. See, e.g., F. COHEN, supra note 42, at 238 (quoting the Act of Aug. 7, 1789,
ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, art. 3, wherein Congress essentially re-enacted the Northwest Ordinance
of 1787):
The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians; their
land and property shall never be taken from them without their consent;
and in their property, rights and liberty, they never shall be invaded or
disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars authorized by Congress; but laws
founded in justice and humanity shall from time to time be made, for
preventing wrongs being done to them, and for preserving peace and
friendship with them.
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that looking upon the treaty as a statute would provide the
"manageable standards" by which the reviewing court could
detect abuse.93 Accordingly, a court should uphold a reasonable
Indian "agency" interpretation even if it does not agree with
it.9 Further, a tribal "agency" decision, under this theory, could
not be reviewed on the ground that the prior decision was
erroneous. 95 However, as will be discussed later, something more
crucial than a determination of the proper scope of review is
missing under an agency theory-finality on matters of Indian
affairs.
Upon reviewing an agency decision, federal courts have the
power to make their own determinations on constitutional ques-
tions.9 In effect, this means Mrs. Colliflower was free to assert
constitutional claims and not be bound by any determination of
those claims by the Indian court. The ruling by the district court
allowing review apparently was valid, even though it meant
sacrificing sovereign, tribal powers. The district court's review
apparently was viewed as just because it sought to provide basic
fairness via an impartial decision maker, especially in sensitive
matters of fundamental rights. The district court also may have
considered the withholding of judicial review as a hardship for
Mrs. Colliflower. 97 Such a view, however, flies in the face of
many traditional tribal concepts of fairness and justice.
Impartiality is not a feature that Indians seek in meting out
their justice. On the contrary, the Indian justifiably seeks a
decision partial to Indian tribal customs and traditions to assure
"real justice" as he perceives it.98 The Indian concept of justice
is based on judgments made by the tribe according to the unique
93. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985).
94. Chevron, USA v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
95. See, e.g., ICC v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engrs., 482 U.S. 270 (1987).
96. Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920).
97. Yet Professor C. Wilkinson notes that "[o]ne cannot completely reconcile classic
political rights, as enjoyed by citizens in other political units in the United States, with
the kind of rights that exist within Indian tribal governments for the fundamental reason
that Indian tribal governments are literally foreign: they exist outside of the Constitu-
tion." C. Wn.WSON, AmmucAN INDiANs, TEm, AND Tm LAW 112 (1987). See also 5
J. STEIn, G. MrrcHELL & B. MEznmS, ADmnSTRATnvE LAW § 48.04 (1988) ("Hardships
due to withholding review may occur when the agency action has a direct and immediate
effect on or causes change in the day to day behavior of the complaining party ....
Hardship may be established by showing detrimental economic impact, added expense,
untoward social consequences or significant environmental damage.
98. See, e.g., Tso, The Process of Decision-Making in Tribal Courts, 16 Ras. L.
NoTs 2 (1989). "In traditional Navajo culture the concept of a disinterested, unbiased
decision maker is unknown." Id. at 4.
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circumstances of each situation. This means that Indian tribunals
are not likely to view themselves as agents of their "Great
Father," whose will they must carry out according to a set code
of laws. Consequently, any attempt to characterize Indian tri-
bunals as federal agencies should fail. This is true more so when
one takes into account that Indian tribunals existed even before
the federal government. 99
Since Colliflower, in fact, did involve an Indian court resulting
from legislation (the IRA), the court technically could be con-
sidered an agency creature of the federal government. Yet, many
of today's Indian tribunals were created not by statute but by
the tribes themselves. Precisely because of the narrow preceden-
tial quality of Collifower, the strength of the argument against
the agency theory is not diminished. 1°°
AJithough the Ninth Circuit in Colliflower stood alone among
federal courts in finding jurisdiction to review tribal court de-
cisions, some state courts began to reflect a similar reasoning
as to their ability to review tribal court decisions. Encroachment
upon tribal sovereignty thus extended beyond the federal court
system. For example, the Colorado Supreme Court agreed to
hear a case where the plaintiff had been excluded from the
reservation in Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe.10 The court
reasoned that to deprive the plaintiff of the right to be heard
in some court, amounted to a deprivation of equal protection
of the laws. The judgment of the lower Colorado court was
thus reversed and the case was remanded with directions to
overrule the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter juris-
diction.' 02
99. See, e.g., National Farmers Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845,
851 (1985) ("The tribes also retain some of the inherent powers of the self-governing
political communities that were formed long before Europeans first settled in North
America."); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978) (noting tribes as
separate sovereigns preexisting the Constitution); United States v. Oregon, 657 F.2d
1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating tribe's sovereignty substantially predates Constitution).
100. One author states that "Coiliflower was thus an intrusion into tribal affairs
although of an admittedly restricted nature since the appellate court would not venture
to suggest that the doctrine be applied indiscriminately to other tribes." DELORIA, supra
note 35, at 131-32.
101. 150 Col. 504, 374 P.2d 691 (1962). A similar result was reached in Boyer v.
Shoshone-Bannock Indian Tribes, 92 Idaho 247, 441 P.2d 167 (1968).
102. Martinez, 374 P.2d at 694. More recent decisions suggest, however, that equal
protection guarantees do not necessarily have to parallel constitutional provisions when
applied in a tribal context. See, e.g., McCurdy v. Steele, 506 F.2d 653, 655-56 (10th
Cir. 1974); Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674, 682 (10th Cir. 1971); Conroy v. Frizzell,
429 F. Supp. 918, 925 (D.S.D. 1977). See also Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384
(1896).
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Colliflower was decided in 1965 just as the civil rights move-
ment was gaining popular momentum in the United States.
Perhaps due in part to the nature of the political climate of the
1960s, the white man began showing signs of restlessness. Con-
gressional concern that "reservation Indians [did] not possess
the same constitutional rights which are conferred upon all other
Americans by the Bill of Rights of the Constitution' 01°3 led to
an extensive series of congressional hearings.10 These hearings
were conducted in Washington, D.C. as well, as on or near
Indian reservations. Not surprisingly, legislators focused on abuse
of Indians' rights by tribal courts as much as, if not more than,
the issue of Indian justice. 0 5 From those hearings emerged the
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA).' 6
Judicial Maintenance of a White Vision
Systematic Erosion of Indian Rights
It is perhaps no coincidence that there are ten provisions in
the "Indian Bill of Rights," as the ICRA has become known.' 7
103. 113 CONG. Rzc. S35,472 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 1967). It is true, of course, that
there were Indians concerned as United States citizens with protecting their constitutional
rights. However, the tone of the legislative hearings was clearly toward a limitation on
the latitude of self-government which tribes previously had enjoyed. See generally
NATIONAL AMERCAN INDIAN COURT JuDGEs ASsOciATIoN, INDAN CoRTS AND THE
FuTult (D. Getches ed. 1978).
104. E.g., S. REPX. No. 841, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); Hearings on Const. Rights
of the Am. Indian Before the Subcommittee on Const. Rights of the Sen. Committee
on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 (1961); 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 (1961);
87th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3 (1962); 88th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 4 (1963); Hearings on
Const. Rights of the Am. Indian S. 961-68 & S.J. Res. 40, Before the Subcommittee
on Const. Rights of the Sen. Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965);
Subcommittee on Const. Rights of the Sen. Committee on the Judiciary, Const. Rights
of the Am. Indian: Summ. Rep. of Hearings and Investigations Pursuant to S. Res.
194, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-11, 25 (1966).
105. S. BRAxEL, supra note 36, at 8.
106. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1303 (1982).
107. The ICRA provides in relevant part:
No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall -
(1) make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of
religion, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to
petition for a redress of grievances;
(2) [prohibits unreasonable searches];
(3) subject any person for the same offense to be twice put
in jeopardy;
(4) compel any person in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself;
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This is because since "the formation of the Union and the
adoption of the Bill of Rights, the United States has manifested
an equally great solicitude that its citizens, [including Indians,]
be protected by the United States from unwarranted intrusions
on itheir personal liberty."'' 0
Many commentators have written about the likely intent of
Congress in using almost verbatim the language of the United
States Constitution.' 9 The general consensus is that Congress
had a sincere desire to protect American Indians' constitutional
rights, while acknowledging that Indians are not subject to
par-alel constitutional constraints. Significantly, the ICRA does
not prohibit the establishment of religion, nor does it require
jury trials in civil cases. Furthermore, a criminal defendant can
have appointed counsel but only at the defendant's expense.
One expert in Indian law asserts that the "guarantees" of the
ICRA "strike at the heart of tribal sovereignty and threaten the
basis of tribal self-government by allowing review of tribal action
in the federal courts according to criteria borrowed from the
(5) take any private property for a public use without just
compensation;
(6) [right to speedy trial, confrontation of witnesses and
counsel at own expense];
(7) [prohibits cruel and unusual punishment];
(8) [guarantees equal protection of tribe's laws and due
process];
(9) pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law; or
(10) deny to any person accused of an offense punishable
by imprisonment the right, upon request, to a trial by jury
of not less than six persons.
25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1982).
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be available to any person,
in a court of the United States, to test the legality of his detention by
order of an Indian tribe.
25 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982).
108. D. WAcmHmh, Indian Law Enforcement, in INDiAUs AND CRimAL JuSrIca 119
(L. French ed. 1982).
109. Note, The Indian Bill of Rights and the Constitutional Status of Tribal Gov-
ernmer:ts, 82 HA v. L. Rv. 1343 (1969); Rieblich, Indian Rights Under the Civil Rights
Act of 1968, 10 ARm. L. Ray. 617 (1968); Warren, An Analysis of the Indian Bill of
Rights, 33 MoNT. L. Ray. 255 (1972); Burnett, An Historical Analysis of the 1968
"Indian Civil Rights" Act, 9 HARv. J. oN LEois. 557 (1972); Ziontz, In Defense of
Tribal Sovereignty: An Analysis of Judicial Error in Construction of the Indian Civil
Rights Act, 20 S.D.L. Ray. 1 (1975); Note, Indian Bill of Rights, 5 Sw. U.L. PEv. 139
(1973); Note, Indians-Criminal Procedure, Habeas Corpus as an Enforcement Proce-
dure Under the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 46 WAsH. L. REv. 541 (1971); Smith,
Tribal ,overeignty and the Indian Bill of Rights, 3 Civ. RTs. Dio. 9, 15 (1970).
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Bill of Rights and couched in the familiar language of American
constitutional jurisprudence."" 0 It is this "familiar language"
that brings with it all the baggage of western European civili-
zation. This explains why "[t]o many Indians the Act is an
assault on tribal sovereignty, for it allows an action to be
brought in federal court for matters that, in the eyes of its
detractors, are solely the concern of the Indians."'
At first glance, it may seem unclear why white Americans
would attempt to apply specific traditions of European legal
heritage to the totally different situation of the American Indian.
This is especially true since the unique traditions of Indians have
been well known since the days of the Founding Fathers. Fur-
thermore, no attempt was ever made "to equate these traditions
with the traditions of English common law or to force the
Indians, in their internal judicial procedure, to follow English
models."" 2 So why start in 1968?
The answer presents itself when we examine the historical
roots of American jurisprudence. The United States Constitution
begins with "We the people." But to whom does that phrase
refer? This written instrument, agreed upon by the people of
the Union as the absolute rule of action and decision, was never
consented to by the American Indians. Yet, despite the clear
understanding that Indians were not included in "We the peo-
ple,""' Congress decided in 1968 to impose upon Indians white
American democratic traditions." 4 These imposed rights arose
110. See de Raismes, supra note 8, at 59. Ironically, this same expert concludes his
article in support of the ICRA with a few revisions. See Id. at 101-03.
111. AismcAc I-DmANs AND am LAW 5 (L. Rosen ed. 1976). As one might expect:
Indian response [to the ICRA] was mixed during the legislative process.
Some tribes had no objection in principle but believed that the legislation
was unnecessary. Others argued that the legislation would unduly formalize
tribal court systems. Still others, including the traditional Pueblos of the
Southwest, opposed any incursions whatsoever on their tribal sovereignty.
FEDEPAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 15, at 368. For a discussion on the desire of Indians
who sought protection from their own governments, see W. WAsHtmRN, THE INViAN iN
AMERICA 272 (1975).
112. W. WAsanuRuN, RED MAN's LAND / Wvmm MAN's LAW: A STUDY Op TE PAST
AND PRESENT STATUS Op THE AMERICAN INDIAN 173 (1971).
113. See generally id. at 174-76; Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 99-100 (1884) ("Under
the Constitution ... as originally established ... General Acts of Congress did not
apply to Indians, unless so expressed as to clearly manifest an intention to include
them.").
114. The issue was really joined in 1924 when the Citizenship Act of 1924 naturalized
all Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States. See 8 U.S.C. §
1401(a)(2) (1982). For many Indians the quest for citizenship was not an important
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"from the white man's culture-from manifest destiny, mission-
ary zeal and from capitalist individualism-indeed from the very
aspects of the white man's culture which have acted as the
motivating force behind the exploitation of the Native American
people and their homeland.""' 5
It thus becomes clear that the answer to the above question
is that white Americans never attempted to equate European
traditions with Indian traditions. Thus, the ICRA was really not
as extraordinary for Indians as one might suppose. The forceful
imposition of white ways upon the red man started long before
the ICRA. However, it was from this essentially paternalistic
legislation" 6 that arose the case of Dodge v. Nakai."
17
In Dodge, the white plaintiff, Theodore Mitchell, had been
permanently excluded from the Navajo Indian Reservation by
the tribal council after laughing during an Advisory Committee
meeting. The tribal leaders viewed the plaintiff's laughter as full
of ridicule and scorn for the committee. Mitchell's conduct had
such an effect on the members of the committee that it compelled
Mrs. Annie Wauneka to admonish him for laughing in the
Council Chambers. The next day, upon the committee's recon-
vening, Mrs. Wauneka asked Mitchell if he intended to laugh
again. Mitchell attempted to apologize but Mrs. Wauneka struck
him several times and ordered him to leave the Council Cham-
bers, which he did. The following day, the Advisory Committee
passed a resolution to remove Mitchell from the reservation.
The decision to remove Mitchell also appears to have been based
in part on a history of difficulty between Mitchell and the
Navajo Tribe."'
In his appeal to the United States District Court, Mitchell
sued the tribal chairman to set aside the exclusion order. The
cause:
Indeed, some Indians resist the notion that they, as members of a tribe
that is an independent sovereign, can be made citizens without their request
or consent .... [However,] Congress' [plenary] power over Indian affairs
[has been deemed] adequate to confer citizenship on Indians notwithstand-
ing their personal sentiments or seemingly contrary treaty provisions.
FDnmuRA INDiAN LAW, supra note 15, at 552. See also Ex parte Green, 123 F.2d 862
(2d Cir. 1941), cert. denied 316 U.S. 668 (1942).
11:5. See de Raismes, supra note 8, at 99.
116. See Coulter, Federal Law and Indian Tribal Law: The Right to Civil Counsel
and the 1968 Indian Bill of Rights, 3 CoLuM. Ht. RTs. L. Rav. 49, 50 (1971).
117. 298 F. Supp. 26 (D. Ariz. 1969).
118. Dodge, 298 F. Supp. at 30-31.
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district court found jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,119
1343(1), 1343(4),12 1361,121 and 1651.1 2 The only question the
court addressed was "whether the exclusion of Mitchell from
the Navajo Reservation was lawful in light of Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968."'
After finding that the Navajo Advisory Committee had ex-
cluded Mitchell on "wholly unreasonable" grounds, i.e., the
committee's interpretation of his laughter, the district court
concluded that Marshall's exclusion was lacking in due process
and abridged his freedom of speech.'2 Accordingly, the exclu-
sion order was invalidated and the defendant was enjoined from
removing or excluding Mitchell.'1
The Dodge decision was significant because "based as it is
on Anglo-American legal principles, [it] not only open[ed] the
substantive tribal law to challenge but also allow[ed] the federal
court to scrutinize both the structure and procedures of the
traditional Indian governments." 1 Additionally, the Dodge rul-
ing rendered the decision of the Navajo Tribal Council mean-
ingless. During Congressional hearings on the ICRA, the Pueblos
of New Mexico had expressed this same concern. In opposing
the habeas corpus provision, they argued that it opened "an
avenue through which Federal courts, lacking knowledge of [the
Pueblos] traditional values, customs, and laws, could review and
offset the decisions of [their] tribal councils."12 7 Thus, even at
the embryonic stage of the ICRA's history, problems of its
application loomed on the horizon.
119. Section 1331 confers general jurisdiction on federal district courts over actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
120. Section 1343 confers jurisdiction on federal district courts over various kinds
of civil rights actions such as violations of federal constitutional or statutory rights
alleged to have taken place under color of state law.
121. This section made available nationally a mandamus remedy to federal district
courts.
122. Section 1651 enables federal courts to issue "all writs necessary or appropriate
in aid of their respective jurisdictions." However, the statute may only be invoked in
a district court as an aid to already existing jurisdiction. See, e.g., Stafford v. Superior
Court, 272 F.2d 407, 409 (9th Cir. 1959).
123. Dodge, 298 F. Supp. at 29. Mitchell's civil suit charged violations of the free
speech (25 U.S.C. § 1302(1)), due process (25 U.S.C. § 1302(8)), and bill of attainder
(25 U.S.C. § 1302(9)) provisions of the ICRA.
124. Id. at 32.
125. Id. at 34.
126. Note, Implication of Civil Remedies Under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 75
MICH. L. Rav. 210, 212 (1976).
127. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 70 n.30 (1978) (citation omitted).
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According to Navajo custom, there is nothing unusual in
banishing an Indian from a tribe when the tribe deems an
Indian's conduct such as to warrant exclusion. In that respect,
Mrs. Wauneka and the Advisory Committee merely followed
the procedure that would have been followed had an Indian
been guilty of Mitchell's disrespectful laughter. One critic of the
Dodge case notes that "[flor a white man who had previously
placed himself in defiance of tribal government to enter into the
seat of government of that tribe, on their reservation and to
laugh scornfully in the face of tribal government, may within
the culture of the Navajo tribe constitute a grave transgres-
sion."'2
The exclusion of Mitchell from the reservation was a pill too
hard. to swallow, not only for him but for the district court that
heard his appeal as well. In deciding that Mitchell's exclusion
was "wholly unreasonable," the district court revealed its white
man standard by which it measured the Navajos' reasonableness.
However, such an approach misses the mark.
The better approach would have been to ask: Did the Navajos
treat Mitchell the way they would have treated a Navajo for the
same offense? If the answer is yes, as it probably should be,
then Mitchell must accept the Navajo decision as final. 129 If the
answer was that Mitchell was singled out for harsher treatment
than an Indian would have been by Navajo custom, Mitchell's
position is strengthened.
'he result of Dodge v. Nakai is a court-sanctioned intrusion
into the sovereignty of all Indian tribes. It substantiated the
fears many Indians held about the ICRA's intrusive nature upon
Indian independence. 30 The decision also effectively reduced the
level of deference one would expect be paid to a sovereign,
Indian nation. The Indian continued to be viewed by the federal
128. Ziontz, supra note 109, at 50-51.
129. In this respect, Mitchell's claim would be obviated since 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8)
guarantees a person within a tribe's jurisdiction "the equal protection of its laws .... "
Id. (emphasis added). No mention is made in the ICRA of a guarantee of white man's
laws. Thus, banishment is appropriate since that is part of the Navajo's laws. This
remains true notwithstanding that Anglos view banishment as "a fate universally decried
by civilized people." Thiess v. State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws, 387 F. Supp. 1038,
1042 (1). Md. 1974). It makes little sense to say that the federal government will respect
the substantive criminal laws of a state but not those of a dependent domestic nation.
See, e.g., Comment, The Armed Career Criminal Act: When Burglary Is Not Burglary,
26 WirxAmmrr L. Rv. 171, 190 (1989) (suggesting that a "state acting within its
sovereign, constitutional powers, should able to say what is burglary within its borders
for use of [a federal] Act's enhancement penalties.").
130, DEmoxA, supra note 35, at 132.
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judiciary as incapable of remaining within the parameters of
white-conceived notions of fairness and justice.
Supreme Court Inconsistency
Upon examination of Supreme Court decisions, it is not sur-
prising to discover that the Court, too, vacillates unpredictably
in its Indian policy. One case in the modern era which supports
the exercise of substantial tribal governing powers within Indian
territory is Williams v. Lee.131
In Williams, a non-Indian merchant sued a Navajo Indian
and his wife to collect a debt for goods sold them on the
reservation. The Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed the lower
Arizona court's finding of proper jurisdiction, since no act of
Congress expressly forbade Arizona courts from doing so. The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari "[b]ecause this
was a doubtful determination of the important question of state
power over Indian affairs . .. 2132
Following a discussion of the extensive background of the
Worcester decision, the Court determined that without doubt,
Arizona's exercise of state jurisdiction would undermine tribal
court authority over reservation affairs. Such jurisdiction
would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern
themselves. It is immaterial that respondent [was] not
an Indian. He was on the Reservation and the trans-
action with an Indian took place there. The cases in
this Court have consistently guarded the authority of
Indian governments over their reservations.
133
The Court noted that where there is no governing act of Con-
gress, the question is whether state action infringes on "the right
of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by
them. '1 34 Since Arizona did infringe on Indian rights, the Court
reversed the decision of the Arizona Supreme Court.
3
1
A reading of only the Williams case might leave one with a
mistaken impression of unreserved support by the Court for
131. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
132. Id. at 218.
133. Id. at 223.
134. Id. at 220 (citing Utah & N. Ry. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28 (1885)).
135. Id. at 223. However, Judge Canby notes that "It]he object of Williams v.
Lee-protection of tribal government-is frustrated by a division of jurisdiction between
state and tribal courts that is solely dependent upon who sues first, particularly when
plaintiff must seek relief in his adversary's native court." Canby, Civil Jurisdiction and
the Indian Reservation, 1973 UTAH L. Rnv. 206, 222 [hereinafter Indian Jurisdiction].
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Indian self-government. This impression would likely be
strengthened when Williams is viewed together with the decision
rendered nearly two decades later in Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez.
36
In. Santa Clara Pueblo, a female member of the Santa Clara
Pueblo tribe and her daughter sought declaratory and injunctive
relief in Federal District Court against the Pueblo tribe and its
Governor pursuant to section 8 of the ICRA. The original
complaint alleged that a tribal ordinance which denied tribal
mernbership to the children of female members who marry
outside the tribe, but not to similarly situated children of men
of that tribe, violated the equal protection provision of the
ICRA. 13
The district court found jurisdiction and concluded that the
ICRA, impliedly authorized civil actions for declaratory and
injunctive relief and that the Pueblo tribe was not immune to
such suit. After a full trial, the court found for the Pueblo tribe
on the merits. 13 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed on
the jurisdictional issue but reversed on the merits. 39 Thereafter,
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Court recognized one threshold issue: does the ICRA
impliedly authorize civil actions for declaratory or injunctive
relief against a tribe or its officers in federal courts?"4° Justice
Marshall began his opinion with a succinct overview of federal-
tribal relationships since the days of Chief Justice Marshall.'
4'
The Court's opinion pointed out the historical attributes of
American Indian tribal sovereignty and the tribes' power to
make their own substantive law in internal matters. It noted
that the tribes' powers of self-governance as separate sovereigns
pre-date the United States Constitution. However, Marshall also
acknowledged Congress' plenary power to limit, modify or elim-
inate those powers.
42
Marshall viewed the ICRA as an exercise of Congress' plenary
power. But since Indian tribes had traditionally enjoyed common
law fmmunity from suit, the Court determined that immunity
could not be implied but must be unequivocally expressed. Here,
136. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
137. Id. at 51.
138. Id. at 53.
139. Id. at 54-55.
140. Id. at 52.
141. Id. at 55 (citing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832)).
142. Id. at 55-56 (citations omitted).
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there was no such expression by Congress. Thus, the suit against
the tribe was barred. 43
The Court noted in dicta that Congress had held extensive
hearings on whether or not to provide more methods of relief
than habeas corpus under the ICRA. Thus, Congress' decision
not to mention review of civil cases was well-considered. The
Court also recognized the likelihood of undermining tribal au-
thority by resolving Indian disputes in a forum other than their
own. In this manner, the Court apparently sought to show
"proper respect both for tribal sovereignty itself and for the
plenary power of Congress." 144 Accordingly, the Court of Ap-
peals decision was reversed. 45
As of 1985, the Ninth Circuit appeared to remain true to the
spirit and tenor of the Santa Clara Pueblo decision in Cheme-
huevi Indian Tribe v. California State Bd. of Equalization.'" In
Chemehuevi, the tribe brought suit challenging California's tax
on tribal cigarette sales on the Chemehuevi reservation to non-
Indians. The tribe sought injunctive relief to prevent enforcement
of the state cigarette law against it. Thereafter, the Board of
Equalization filed a counterclaim for the amount of taxes alleg-
edly due. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the
tribe's sovereign immunity barred a counterclaim by California
state. Also, the disputed tax on tribal cigarette sales was deter-
mined to be preempted by federal law because it imposed the
state tax directly upon the tribe. 47 Thus, to the uninitiated, the
Court's pro-sovereignty policy seemed to be followed fairly
consistently.
However, in the very same year as the Ninth Circuit's decision
in Chemehuevi, the Supreme Court rendered an obscurely rea-
soned opinion in National Farmers Union Ins. Co's v. Crow
Tribe of Indians.4 It is unclear whether the Court in National
Farmers was attempting to apply existing federal Indian law to
the facts before it, or whether it intended to make new federal
inroads on tribal sovereignty. The ambiguity is evident in Justice
Stevens' treatment of the jurisdictional issue in the case.
National Farmers involved a Crow Indian minor whose guard-
ian had obtained a default judgment in a Crow tribal court
143. Id. at 57-59.
144. Id. at 60.
145. Id. at 72.
146. 757 F.2d 1047 (9th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 474 U.S. 9 (1985), remanded, 800 F.2d
1446 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1051 (1987).
147. Id. at 1050.
148. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
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against the school district on whose property the minor had
suffered injury. The default judgment was awarded pursuant to
the Indian's remedy available in tort law as administered by the
Crow tribal court. The default judgment thus resulted from the
Indian's right under tribal law. Still, the school district's insurer,
National Farmers, sought injunctive relief in federal district
court, invoking federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The
district court held that the tribal court had no jurisdiction over
a civil action against a non-Indian and thus enjoined execution
of the tribal court judgment. Finding a lack of federal jurisdic-
tion in the district court, a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the district court decision.149
The Supreme Court began its analysis by quoting section 1331
of the Judicial Code, which provides that a federal district court
"shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."'5 0
Justice Stevens took this to mean that a "suit arises under the
law that creates the cause of action.'' He reasoned that since
the question of the Crow tribal court's civil jurisdiction must
be answered by reference to federal law, the query becomes a
"federal question" under section 1331.152 But it is the simplicity
of :his appealing solution to a complex problem that belies its
error.
On the one hand, the Court recognizes Congress' commitment
to a policy of support for self-government and self-determina-
tion. Further, the Court noted that although criminal jurisdiction
over Indian offenses does lie in the federal courts, "there is no
comparable legislation granting the federal courts jurisdiction
over civil disputes between Indians and non-Indians that arise
on an Indian reservation.'
' 5 3
On the other hand, the Court elevated a mere court rule of
procedure to a level of significance that nullifies centuries of
substantive case law and statutory law. The petitioner-insurance
company successfully converted what was once a problem of
civil, rights under Indian law to one of procedural rights under
the white man's law.
A. more sound, analytical approach would have been for the
Court to have initially determined whether the federal govern-
14.9. Id. at 847-49.
150. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
151. National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 850-51 (quoting American Well Works Co. v.
Layne and Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916)).
152. Id. at 852.
153. Id. at 854 (citing F. COHEN, supra note 42, at 253).
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ment had ever divested the Crow Tribe of jurisdiction over cases
like the present one. This preliminary determination would seem
to be mandated by the Court's own recognition that "Indian
tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn
by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of
their dependent status."'" Yet, the Court did not begin with
such a preliminary query.
Instead, the Court appeared to proceed on the insurance
companies' contention that the Crow Tribe had somehow been
divested of its inherent tribal sovereignty. But that contention
was a mere defense and had little, if anything, to do with the
underlying right of the plaintiff. Moreover, "[tihe possible ne-
cessity of interpreting a federal statute or treaties to resolve a
potential defense [has been] deemed insufficient to sustain fed-
eral question jurisdiction.' 5 Thus, the insurance companies'
complaint should have been dismissed for failure of the com-
plaint to raise a question "arising under" the laws of the United
States within the meaning of section 1331. This is owing to the
fact that a claim fails "where the underlying right or obligation
arises only under state law and federal law is merely alleged as
a barrier to its effectuation. 1 56
According to Justice Stevens, the question of jurisdiction had
to be answered by reference to federal law and was therefore a
federal question. But Justice Stevens was answering the wrong
question. The underlying cause of action for the injured Crow
Tribe member arose under tribal law. Therefore, the focus of
inquiry should have been on the source of the right. Here, the
focus was shifted to section 1331, a statute that provided a
154. Id. at 852 n.14 (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323-26 (1978)).
155. Oneida Indian Nation of New York State v. Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974). See
also Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 157
(1953):
Starting with the almost self-evident postulate that a court's jurisdiction
of a suit must be determined as of the entrance of the litigation into the
tribunal, it [becomes] clear that although appellate jurisdiction may be
made to depend upon the whole record below, the only material available
in the court of first instance is the initial pleading. From this, it would
seem to follow that original jurisdiction must be established by what is
contained in the complaint.
Id. at 164.
156. Oneida, 414 U.S. at 662, 675. Cf. Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109
(1936). See also C. WRorr, A. MILER & E. CooPEa, FEDERAL PRACnTCE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 3566 (1984) (noting that United States Supreme Court has consistently required
that a federal question must be presented on the face of plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint
and cannot depend on an anticipated defense).
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federal procedural right. Accordingly, the proper result from
the district court should have been a decision in part like the
Supreme Court's, holding that tribal remedies must be ex-
hausted. However, unlike the Supreme Court's conclusion, a
proper evaluation of the district court's jurisdiction would reveal
that it was nonexistent.
By granting jurisdiction under section 1331, the Court effec-
tivelty extended the degree to which federal law may curtail the
powers of tribal courts. Without any detailed explanation, the
Court sidestepped the jurisdictional question and proceeded to
develop a judicial rule of exhaustion of tribal remedies.
An exhaustion rule provides the forum whose jurisdiction is
being challenged the first opportunity to evaluate the factual
and legal bases for the challenge. It also requires that a federal
court stay its hand until after the tribal court has determined
its own jurisdiction and corrected any errors it may have made.
Since tribal remedies had not been exhausted, the Supreme Court
reversed and remanded the case, adding still another phase to
the "procedural nightmare" which the Crow Indian victim had
to endure.
5 7
National Farmers is a puzzling decision, since clear statements
of Indian policy on jurisdictional questions had already been
articulated by the Court in 1978. In Santa Clara Pueblo, the
Court had recognized that "unless and until Congress makes
clea:r its intention to permit the additional intrusion on tribal
sovereignty" that adjudication of civil claims would represent,
the Court would not find implied authority for granting declar-
atory or injunctive relief against either a tribe or its officers.,"S
A cearer case of res judicata than that in National Farmers is
difficult to imagine, since National Farmers sought injunctive
relief where there clearly was no express authority for such
relief.
Given the preceding account of American Indian history from
Johnson v. M'Intosh to National Farmers, one would expect
some degree of consistency, at least in Supreme Court cases.
However, as seen from the discussion on the ever-shifting federal
government policies, Indian law presents a landscape of many
hills and valleys. Forced to function in this setting, Indian tribal
courts still have shown so strong a resilience that they have
survived from pre-Constitution days until the present. But all is
not well on the reservation.
157. National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 853-57.
158. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978).
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As seen in National Farmers, a slow but gradual erosion of
tribal governments and their courts is occurring.5 9 Perhaps it is
not a conscious effort, but the continuance of this trend will
surely be the death knell of any real sovereignty which Indian
tribes enjoy. Such a dismal view recognizes that a right of
sovereignty which can be abolished at the will of the federal
courts is largely meaningless as a legal right.' 60 The next section
of this article proposes one solution to the erosion of tribal
court sovereignty: a Federal Indian Court of Appeals.
An Alternative Within the Existing Judicial Schemata
It would be convenient to be able to resolve disputes involving
American Indians and Indian lands by simply resorting to the
courts as we routinely do with many other disputes, but
"[n]othing ever seems routine in Indian cases."' 6' The unique-
ness of these cases comes from the attempt of the federal
government to treat Indian tribes as "dependent domestic
nations"' and at the same time as separate sovereigns with
powers of self-government. 63 Thus, "Indian people face the
same contradiction when they recognize the injustice of a legal
system that explicitly precludes recognition of native govern-
mental rights, but are nevertheless forced by practical realities
to argue within that system for protection of their remaining
rights."' 64 The clash between these two themes becomes readily
159. See, e.g., Indian Law Resource Center, Indian-State Relations and "Tribal-
State Compacts," in REaTmxno INDIAN LAW 85, 86 (1982) ("The crumbling of court
protection is relatively recent. It is not yet clear whether this signifies a permanent shift
in the evolution of the United States Indian Law."). One author notes that "[t]raditional
Indian justice has survived in spite of four hundred years of outside attempts to convert
Native Americans to the Western model of formal justice." L. FRENCH, Introduction:
An Historical Analysis of Indian Justice, in IN s AND C ,am. JusricE 12 (L.
French ed. 1982).
160. For a discussion on the Court's lack of conceptual clarity on Indian law, see
Berkey, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Bring Confusion to the Law of Indian Sov-
ereignty, in RETHninao INDLN LAW 77 (1982); Barsh, Is There Any Indian "Law"
Left? A Review of the Supreme Court's 1982 Term, 59 WASH. L. REv. 863, 863-64
(1984) ("There has been no consistent authorship of opinions because the Justices hold
little enthusiasm for Indian law cases, and the Court seems to treat each dispute as if
it were a matter of first impression.") (citing B. WOODWARD & S. ARmsTRoNo, THE
BmTHRN, 57-58, 359, 412 (1980)).
161. Hughes, Indian Law, 18 N.M.L. REv. 403, 467 (1988).
162. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831).
163. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55-56 (1978); Note, In
Defense of Tribal Sovereign Immunity, 95 IItv. L. Rnv. 1058 (1982).
164. Clinebell & Thomson, Sovereignty and Self-Determination: The Rights of Native
Americans Under International Law, 27 BuFFALo L. REv. 669, 671 (1978).
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apparent in questions of appellate review of Indian tribunal
decisions. For the purpose of understanding this dissonance,
some background of Indian courts may be helpful.
Some of the current tribal courts resulted from the era of the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA),16 but many more are
modified versions of older tribal adjudicatory mechanisms.166
Since there never was statutory authorization for these latter
types of courts, "[iut was recognized from the first that there
was, at best, a shaky legal foundation for these tribunals."' 6
Still, Indian tribunals and their existence in our modern-world
judicial system are an accomplished fact. Yet are they really
within the federal judicial system, or are they actually outside
the system while the federal government and judiciary tries to
drag them in? The following discussion attempts to answer this
question and to offer an alternative to the present federal ap-
pellate court structure as it affects review of Indian tribunal
decisions.
Legitimizing Indian Tribunals
In order for courts to be legitimate, non-Indian America calls
for the administration of justice according to the rule of law.
What this has meant is that judicial decisions must logically
foll]ow from rules and not from personal or other values not
validated by the law.Ie Yet the strength of the white man's legal
system is the weakness of the Indian's system. 69 Exemplifying
165. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-62, 464-79 (1983); 25 U.S.C. § 463 (Supp. 1987). The IRA
provides in part that "[a]ny Indian tribe, or tribes ... shall have the right to organize
for its common welfare, and may adopt an appropriate constitution and bylaws, which
shall become effective when ratified by a majority vote of the adult members of the
tribe." Id. § 476. See also Indian Jurisdiction, supra note 135, at 206. "Although the
traditional methods of resolving disputes varied tremendously among the different tribes,
the first Indian courts in the West were uniformly imposed by the federal government
upon the tribes without any attempt to pattern them after existing Indian institutions."
Id. at 215 (citation omitted).
166. See, e.g., K. LLEwELLYN & E. HOEBEL, THE CHmENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND
CAsI LAw IN PEDferx JUISPRUDENCE (1941). See also Zion, The Navaho Peacemaker
Court: Deference to the Old and Accommodation to the New, I1 AM. INDAN L. Rv.
89 (1983); Indian Jurisdiction, supra note 135, at 215-16 ("While a few Courts of Indian
Offenses still exist, most of the tribes have organized their own tribal courts, usually
under the power of self-government confirmed by the Indian Reorganization Act.")
(citations omitted).
167. Pommersheim, The Contextual Legitimacy of Adjudication in Tribal Courts
and the Role of the Tribal Bar as an Interpretive Community: An Essay, 18 N.M.L.
REv. 49, 51 (1988) (citing W. HAoAN, INDIAN POICE AND JUms, 110 (1966)).
168. Id. at 59.
169. See generally Ziontz, In Defense of Tribal Sovereignty: An Analysis of Judicial
Error in Construction of the Indian Civil Rights Act, 20 S.D.L. Ray. 1, 49 (1975).
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this view, one critic of the Anglo legal system suggests that
federal judges "are often handicapped by ignorance of, or
insensitivity to, the operative standards of Indian political and
personal relationships, by ethnocentrism, or by simple prejudice
against the idea of Indian separatism."1 70 Moreover, the Indian
way of resolving disputes usually does not involve a sterile
analysis of a given situation.' 7' For example, concepts of fairness
and social harmony are basic to the traditions of the Navajo
tribe. 172 Thus, in settling disputes, "[ilt was difficult for Navajos
to participate in a system where fairness required the judge to
have no prior knowledge of the case and where who could speak
and what they could say was closely regulated."' 73 Accordingly,
because of unique Indian traditions such as that of the Navajos,
tribal court adjudications will only be legitimate in the eyes of
Indians when tribal courts function in a social, historical and
cultural context.
Assuming a tribal court can convince its tribal members to
abide by the tribe's law, a still more difficult hurdle must be
overcome-recognized legitimacy in the federal courts. Although
the United States Supreme Court occasionally has paid respect
to tribal courts through an expansive reading of the concept of
tribal immunity, 74 it has also refused to abide by established
law when dealing with Indians. As a result, tribes are in a
conundrum when faced with a particular issue on tribal immu-
nity or sovereignty before the Supreme Court. 75
170. Id. at 48.
171. But see C mIn, COURT PRocED Rms M~A : A GUmE FOR A McAN INDiAN
COURT JuDors, NAT'L AM. INDIAN CoURT JuDnEs Ass'N (1971). The president of this
association in 1971 (Hon. Virgil Kirk, Sr.) was of the opinion that "the crowning glory
of our Society is its independent Judicial System." Id. at v (emphasis added). The
reference here clearly must have been to our non-Indian society.
172. In another example of cultural differences one historian notes that when a
British attempt was made to arrest a non-Indian on Indian land, the Cherokee voiced
concern and opposition. "They might not know why the British quarreled-they most
likely did not care-but sensing a menace to their harmonious way of life, they let the
British know they did not want altercations within their towns." J. Ram, A BEmT
KIND OF HATCHET 178 (1976).
173. Tso, The Process of Decision-Making in Tribal Courts, 16 Rs. L. NoTms 4
(1989). See also S. BRAKE, supra note 36, at 9:
Historically, law, order, and justice in Indian culture were dispensed in
widely varying ways, matching the wide variety in cultures and life-styles
among the tribes .... But there were no "courts" and "judges" in the
sense of the "independent" and "exclusively adjudicative" institutions and
personnel that Anglo-American ideals have them to be.
174. E.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1978).
175. See Berkey, supra note 160.
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It is fundamqntal that "[legitimacy becomes illegitimacy when
large numbers of people in fact cease to recognize an obligation
to abide by law or judicial decisions with which they disagree.' '176
This is essentially what occurred in the case of National Farmers
Insurance Co's v. Crow Tribe of Indians.77
Prior to National Farmers, the rule of law established in Santa
Clara Pueblo was that the only vehicle available to seek review
of decisions under the ICRA was a writ of habeas corpus. 178
Notwithstanding this unambiguous law, the Court allowed a
party to invoke federal-question jurisdiction in a private civil
tribal court action in order to allow a federal court to determine
whether the tribe had jurisdiction. 179 The Court reasoned that
"[b]ecause [National Farmers contended] that federal law ha[d]
divested the Tribe of this aspect of sovereignty, it [was] federal
law on which they relfied] as a basis for the asserted right of
freedom from Tribal Court interference." 1 0 The decision of the
Court effectively refused to honor not only the legitimacy of
the tribal court but of the Court's own precedent as well.
in finding a federal question in what was essentially a civil
suit, National Farmers followed the trail blazed by Oliphant v.
Suquamish Tribe of Indians8' in denying respect to the Indian's
vision of self-government.8 2 In Oliphant, which has been criti-
cized as an aberration in federal Indian law jurisprudence, 3
Justice Rehnquist dealt a serious blow to the federal govern-
ment's progress toward a policy favorable to Indians.' m
176. Pommersheim, supra note 167, at 60.
177. 471 U.S. 845 (1985). See also Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564
(1981) (holding that hunting and fishing rights bore "no clear relationship to tribal self-
gov.rnment or internal relations.") (relying on Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
435 U.S. 191 (1978)).
178. See generally Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 49; 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982)
(expressly providing for writ of habeas corpus to test detention by Indian tribe).
179. National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 852-53.
180. Id.
:181. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
.182. E.g., only three years prior to Oliphant the Court had recognized that Indian
tribis retain "attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory."
United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975).
183. See, e.g., Barsh & Henderson, The Betrayal: Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe and the Hunting of the Snark, 63 MWi. L. Ra,. 609, 610-13 (1979); Note,
Criminal Jurisdiction and Enforcement Problems on Indian Reservations in the Wake
of Oliphant, 7 AM. IN~ixA L. Ra,. 291 (1979).
184. Although not perfect in carrying out their intended effect, various federal
statutes embody the policy to promote tribal government. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 450,
450a (1982) (Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act); 25 U.S.C. §§
476-479 (1982) (IRA); 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1982) (ICRA).
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The issue in Oliphant was whether an Indian tribe, as part of
its inherent powers of self-determination, retained the right to
try and punish non-Indians for minor crimes committed in
Indian communities. Rehnquist stated that "Indian tribes are
proscribed from exercising both those powers of autonomous
states that are expressly terminated by Congress and those pow-
ers inconsistent with their status as domestic dependent
nations." 1"5 But who is to decide what is "inconsistent with
their status?"
Clearly, Rehnquist cannot claim to have relied on Court
precedent. By his own admission the Oliphant issue was a
"relatively new phenomenon." "It [was] therefore not surprising
to find no specific discussion of the problem before [the Court]
in the volumes of the United States Reports,186 and accordingly
no binding authority. Still, Rehnquist managed to fashion a test
based on little more than his apparently-perceived need to avoid
radical divergence from Eurocentric norms. His test amounts to
making a determination whether in a given case tribal interests
conflict with the overriding sovereign interests of the United
States. If they do, then those tribal interests are inconsistent
with their status as dependent, colonized peoples.
One critic noted that "[iun effect, this form of discourse
enforces a highly efficient process of legal auto-genocide, the
ultimate hegemonic effect of which is to instruct the savage to
self extinguish all troublesome expressions of difference that
diverge from the white man's own hierachic [sic], universalized
worldview. 1' Therefore, National Farmers is not as shockingly
different from case law protective of Indian self-government as
one might surmise when considered in light of Oliphant.
There remains no easy solution to understanding the complex
maze of federal Indian law. Still, one recent case, Iowa Mutual
Insurance Co. v. LaPlante,18 8 does seem to provide further clarity
on the question of Indian self-government.
185. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208 (quoting Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009
(9th Cir. 1976)) (emphasis in original). Cases decided after Oliphant, that use this rubric
and logic, are said to use the jurisdictional ploy fashionably called the "Oliphant spin-
off theory." See generally Gover & Laurence, Avoiding Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez.
The Litigation in Federal Court of Civil Actions Under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 8
HAmiNE L. REV. 497 (1985).
186. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 196-97.
187. Williams, supra note 25, at 274. Still another critic notes that Rehnquist "sees
tribal authority as something that Congress must bestow on tribes, rather than something
that tribes posses because they are sovereign entities." See Note, Tribal Sovereignty:
Federal Court Review of Tribal Court Decisions-Judicial Intrusion Into Tribal Sov-
ereignty, 13 Am. hIN-D.N L. REv. 175, 188 (1988) [hereinafter Federal Court Review].
188. 107 S. Ct. 971 (1987).
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In LaPlante, the insurer brought an action seeking a decla-
ration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify LaPlante, the
insured, with respect to an incident which was the subject of a
sult against Iowa Mutual in tribal court. 18 9 The tribal court had
held that "the Tribe could regulate the conduct of non-Indians
engaged in commercial relations with Indians on the reservation.
[Therefore], since the Tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction was co-
exLensive with its legislative jurisdiction, the court concluded
that it would have jurisdiction over the suit."'' 9 Subsequently,
Iowa Mutual filed an action in federal district court, alleging
diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 as the basis for
federal jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the action for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed the order.
The Supreme Court began its analysis by acknowledging that
Indian tribes retain attributes of sovereignty "to the extent that
sovereignty has not been withdrawn by federal statute or
treaty."' 19 The Court then pointed out that 28 U.S.C. § 1332
makes no reference to Indians, and nothing in the legislative
history, old or recent, suggests any intent to render inoperative
the established federal policy promoting tribal self-government.
Neither has there been any expressed intent to limit the civil
jurisdiction of tribal courts. 92
'Relying on National Farmers, the Court held that the issue
of jurisdiction properly should be resolved by the tribal courts
in the first instance. However, the Court also determined the
district court did have subject matter jurisdiction and accordingly
reversed and remanded the case. 93
Upon close analysis of LaPlante, one fact becomes strikingly
clear. Writing for the 8-1 majority, Marshall articulated a pos-
itive restatement of federal Indian law but he argued an unper-
suasive application of that law to LaPlante's facts. For example,
189. Id. at 974. LaPlante suffered personal injuries when the cattle truck he was
driving "jackknifed." At the time of the incident he was an employee of a ranch located
on the Blackfeet Indian reservation and owned by Indians. LaPlante brought suit seeking
compensation from the ranch for his injuries and compensatory and punitive damages
from Iowa Mutual, the ranch's insurer, for its alleged bad faith refusal to settle the
personal injury claim.
190. Id. (footnote omitted).
[91. Id. at 975-76.
.192. Id. at 977-78.
:193. The Court held that the district court should consider whether Iowa Mutual's
suit should be stayed pending further tribal court proceedings or dismissed under
National Farmers prudential rule. Id. at 978-79.
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Marshall stated that "unconditional access to the federal forum
would place [federal courts] in direct competition with the tribal
courts, thereby impairing the latter's authority over reservation
affairs .... [Moreover], adjudication of such matters by any
nontribal court also infringes upon tribal law making, because
tribal courts are best qualified to interpret and apply tribal
law."'9 These statements reasonably could lead one to believe
that Indian tribunals are competent to address and resolve all
issues involving non-Indians on reservation lands. Apparently,
such is not the case.
In the next to the last paragraph of the majority opinion,
Marshall took away with one hand what he had previously given
with the other. He stated that if a tribal appellate court "upholds
the lower court's determination that the tribal courts have ju-
risdiction, petitioner may challenge that ruling in the District
Court."' 195 The obvious question then becomes: Does the Indian
appellate court decision mean anything of significance? The
answer should be a resounding yes. In actuality, however, its
significance is only illusory, in light of LaPlante. Upon appeal,
the petitioner is now in a federal forum applying federal laws.
He is no longer in the legal-political community in which the
underlying cause of action arose. Consequently, he is like a fish
out of water.
Ideally, the opinion would have made a plea for recognition
of finality in Indian tribunal decisions. Those decisions should
be accorded full faith and credit no less than the highest court
of any state. Only by demonstrating this level of deference to
Indian tribunals can Marshall's opinion approximate some sem-
blance of coherence.
Although it appears internally inconsistent, the LaPlante hold-
ing adheres to the view that Indian tribunals are reviewable in
federal courts, thus opening the door still further for potentially
dangerous intrusions into what remains of Indian self-govern-
ment. Despite the increasing federal intrusion on Indian self-
government, white America still continues to treat Indians in a
unique manner. It is in the effort to maintain this "traditional
solicitude for the Indian tribes"' 1 that the following proposal
for a Federal Indian Court of Appeals is advanced.
194. Id. at 977 (citations omitted).
195. Id. at 978 (citing National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 853).
196. See Solem v. Bartlett, 104 S. Ct. .1161, 1167 (1984).
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The Structure and Logistics
of a Federal Indian Court of Appeals
One way to avoid the inconsistent rulings rendered by the
various federal courts on Indian matters is to remove those
matters from the current federal appellate review scheme. 197
Transfer of Indian matters from current federal courts to an
Indian forum would also increase Indian trust and confidence
in the appeals process. This is not to suggest that Indian tribunals
should be under a separate judicial system. On the contrary,
this article agrees with the view that "[tihe burden of persuasion
for separatist ideas should fall on the proponents of separa-
tism. "198 As such, the suggestion here is to keep fundamentally
within the present concept and operation of our judicial system
by creating a Federal Indian Court of Appeals (FICA). Such a
court may be created pursuant to article III of the U.S. Con-
stitution, which provides in relevant part:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as
the Congress may from time to time ordain and es-
tablish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behav-
iour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their
Services, a Compensation, which shall not be dimin-
ished during their Continuance in Office.
The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws
of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority; ... In all Cases
... in which a State shall be a Party, the supreme
Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other
Cases before mentioned [eleven types], the supreme
Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law
and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Re-
gulations as the Congress shall make. 199
197. Cf. C. WILKINSON, AimucAN INDiANs, Tnhm, AND m LAW 113 (1987) ("Re-
specting substantial tribal authority over non-Indians while allowing limited federal
review in individual cases of alleged injustices is the best method of substantially
reconciling the legitimate interests of both tribes and non-Indians.").
198. S. BPAXEL, supra note 36, at 100.
199. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-2. Another rationale for the creation of a FICA is
that the basis for power over tribes was not contemplated by the United States Consti-
tution and Congress simply can create a FICA in exercise of its plenary power.
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First, it is necessary, in order to obviate claims of concurrent
federal or state jurisdiction, that Indian tribunals have original
jurisdiction over all civil cases or controversies arising under
tribal customary law, the Constitution, federal law or treaties.
With tribes having such jurisdictional power to hear cases, the
review of tribunal decisions takes on a new, more significant
meaning. In order for a FICA to be effective, the following
corollaries must logically occur:
(1) Congress should create and maintain the FICA.
(2) The FICA should hear all appeals from Indian tribunals.
(3) FICA decisions may only be reviewed by the United States
Supreme Court by writ of certiorari.
(4) The FICA should be comprised of panels with seven Native
Americans on each panel.
(5) A simple majority of the appellate panel should originate
from the litigant tribe's membership. If two tribes are involved,
one neutral tribe panelist should preside.
(6) The governing law should be that of the litigant tribes,
the United States Constitution, and the relevant states, in that
order of preference.
(7) The judges for the appellate panels should be elected for
life by the tribes' members with no requisite amount of Anglo
legal training.
(8) The judgments of the FICA should be respected, receiving
full faith and credit from all the states and other tribes.
(9) The guiding principle of the FICA should be to assure
that tribal rights are upheld even when adverse to a federal
claim. Technical violations of federal law should not suffice for
Supreme Court review.
These propositions are discussed in turn.
(1) Congress should create and maintain the FICA. The first
proposition is a practical consequence of the need for ultimate
federal supremacy. Since Congress has the power to create new
courts and the power to finance those courts by congressional
appropriations, the burden should be upon Congress, pursuant
to its trust responsibilities, to provide the necessary means for
an Indian court of appeals. Also, by placing Indian tribunal
200. A more extreme view might argue for inclusion of criminal jurisdiction as well.
See, e.g., Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883). The Crow Dog Court noted that
Anglo law judges Indians "by a standard made for others, and not for them .... and
makes no allowance for their inability to understand it." Id. at 571. But see Clinton,
Development of Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: The Historical Perspective,
17 Auz. L. REv. 951 (1975).
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courts on financial par with state supreme courts, Congress
would bring the FICA into a judicial scheme in which the federal
government is involved and the United States Supreme Court is
still the final interpreter of the law of this land.
Additionally, tribes are not and should not be expected to
fund what could amount to a substantial fiscal undertaking.
One might also argue that it is, in part, because of the Anglo
lack of understanding of Indian dispute resolution that a need
for a FICA has been created. Therefore, it is incumbent upon
the federal government, pursuant to its trust relationship with
the Indians, 2°1 to pay for the cost of the "cure." By not imposing
a new financial burden upon the tribes, we can reduce the risk
of preempting much of the decision-making and initiative func-
tions of the talented and "progressive" groups and individuals
on the reservations.m
Moreover, since it is clearly established that Congress has
plenary power over Indians, 2°3 congressional omnipotence is un-
likely, in good conscience, to be used to blatantly suppress the
rights of Indians. The difficulty in creating a mechanism to
protect Indian rights in place of the mechanism that currently
is eroding those rights lies in gaining not only popular support
for the idea but political support as well.2 4 One method of
persuasion may be to lay bare the realities of Indian tribes'
dependency on the federal government for financial support,
and moral support-to whatever degree it exists-in the quest
for self-governance. This is especially true due to the longstand-
ing belief that "[the United States as] trustee is held to something
stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone,
201' See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (Indian
relation to United States resembles that of ward to guardian). See also United States v.
Kagana, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) ("From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely
due to the course of dealing of the federal government with them, and the treaties in
which it has been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power.").
Id. at 384-85.
In some cases the federal trust duty has even extended to protection of Indians from
their own improvidence. See, e.g., Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286
(1942); Menominee Tribe v. United States, 101 Ct. Cl. 22 (1944).
202. See generally Reitz, Leadership, Initiative, and Economic Progress on an Amer-
ican Indian Reservation, 2 EcoN. Day. AND CuLrupn CHANGE 60, 62 (1953).
203. See generally Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896).
204. But see Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 556 (1903) (congressional action
abrogating treaties upheld because "consistent with perfect good faith toward the
Indians"). See generally Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Respon-
sibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213 (1975).
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but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, [should be]
the standard of behavior." 20 5
(2) The FICA should hear all appeals from Indian tribunals.
The second proposition suggests that the FICA should have
exclusive jurisdiction of all appeals from Indian tribunals. This
means the FICA "circuit" would be nationwide. Sessions of the
FICA would best be held on the reservations, conducted in
federal buildings. Such "riding" of the circuit would bring the
FICA within reach of those for whose benefit it was created-
the Indians themselves.
(3) FICA decisions may only be reviewed by the United States
Supreme Court by writ of certiorari. The third proposition is
aimed at granting dignity and finality to the FICA and ultimately
to the Indian tribunals. This is not inconsistent with the current
Supreme Court rule that "review on writ of certiorari is not a
matter of right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted
only when there are special and important reasons therefor."
Accordingly, under the FICA scheme, Supreme Court review
should balance tribal interests against the federal claim at stake,
utilizing favorable Indian law canons of construction. For ex-
ample, when treaty language is construed, it should be construed
as it was understood by the Indian tribal representatives who
negotiated the treaty.2 Also, treaties should be liberally inter-
preted to accomplish their protective purposes, with ambiguities
to be resolved in favor of the Indians.2° Of course, where there
is no ambiguity, treaty language should be applied regardless of
the favorable or not-so-favorable outcome to the Indians.2 9
(4) The FICA should be comprised of panels with seven Native
American Indians on each panel. The fourth proposition is
suggested so as to mirror the makeup of the original court of
205. Seminole Nation, 316 U.S. at 297 n.12 (quoting Chief Judge Cardozo in
Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928)).
206. Sup. CT. R. 17.
207. Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684-85 (1942). See also Clinton, A Man-
datory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Under-
standing of Article III, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 741 (1984). "The process of ascertaining
the meaning of a written text ultimately involves a search for the collective subjective
understanding held by the drafters of the document." Id. at 746 n.11.
208. McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973); Carpenter v.
Shaw, 280 U.S. 363 (1930).
209. Oregon Dep't of Fish & Wildlife v. Klamath Indian Tribe, 473 U.S. 753, 774
(1985). For an examination of the historically unequal bargaining position of Indian
tribes, see Wilkinson & Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As
Long As Water Flows or Grass Grows upon the Earth"--How Long a Time Is That?,
63 CALiF. L. REv. 601 (1975).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1991
158 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16
claims panels. Nine-member panels might reflect more common-
ality with the Supreme Court, but such a number might also
put a strain on some of the tribes' available resources. Also,
the problems accompanying employment preference should be
nonexistent in the FICA since the new appellate structure is an
exercise of congressional authority for people outside normal
constitutional constraints.
210
The reason for having only Native Americans on the panels
is to remain true to the concept of an Indian Court of Appeals
as opposed to a Court of Indian Appeals. The latter type of
court is exclusive as to subject matter. The former is exclusive
in its subject matter and in its decision makers.
(5) A simple majority of the appellate panel should originate
from the litigant tribe's membership. If two tribes are involved,
one neutral tribe panelist should preside. The fifth proposition
addresses an important concern of many who have criticized the
current federal appellate review process. For some, removing a
case from an Indian tribunal to a white legal institution such as
a federal court of appeals is tantamount to de novo review under
different standards than at trial, simply by virtue of the fact
that Anglo jurists are reviewing the matter.21' By requiring that
at least half of the panel judges come from the litigant tribe's
membership, Indians can be better assured of a "fair" appeal.
If two tribes are involved in a case, at least one neutral judge
should preside over an appeal of that case. Some critics suggest
Indiams are probably better able to resolve their own disputes
amongst themselves, than by having to succumb to outsiders'
solutions.212
(6) The governing law should be that of the litigant tribes,
the United States Constitution, and the relevant states, in that
order of preference. The sixth proposition is designed to establish
a clear guide as to the choice of law for the FICA. This
210. Cf. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
211. In a similar vein, legal scholars urge that "[w]here either Indian or non-Indian
attorneys who are not members of the tribe become involved in tribal proceedings, they
obviously need to be sensitive to tribal values." M. PIucE & R. CLINTON, LAW AND
nm AbmiucAN IIuaN 359 (2d ed. 1983). See also Federal Court Review, supra note
187, at 190 (suggesting that "non-Indian involvement [in a particular case, is] the key
to whether sovereignty is used by the Court to rule for the tribe, or whether sovereignty
is limited by the Court to decide against the tribe").
212. See, e.g., G. Cox, Spirits in Collision, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 5, 1990, at 18, col. 1.
Regarding the legal battle between the Hopi and the Navajo in the nation's largest land
title lawsuit, one attorney for the Navajo commented that "it is possible that the two
tribes might have been better off without the intervention of the Anglo legal system."
Id. at 23, col. 2.
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proposition is in accord with the general rule that the forum
applies its own substantive law.
213
Traditionally, "very few tribes have [had] comprehensive codes
or bodies of common law dealing with civil matters, [thus,] state
law [was] likely to govern a large proportion of the civil cases,
particularly those of a nature likely to involve non-Indian par-
ties. ' 214 Because of the supplanting of Indian customary law
with state law, it is understandable why Indians have little faith
in our current federal courts of appeal. Historically, Indian
tribes resolved their disputes without any written law. Theirs
was a system incorporating religious, social, political, and cul-
tural concepts working toward a goal of social harmony.
25
Clarifying the choice of law for the FICA aims to achieve that
goal.
Toward that end, the sixth proposition attempts to provide a
guarantee that review of Indian tribunal decisions will be exer-
cised according to Indian standards. It follows that, in some
instances, there may not be a written code by which to abide.
That, however, is the value of the sixth proposition, i.e., no
written code is essential for resolving a case.
This proposition is in contradistinction to Senator Orin Hatch's
proposed Senate Bill 517 to amend the ICRA. 216 The proposed
bill purportedly "strikes a legitimate balance between the inter-
ests of the tribal governments in exercising their powers of self-
government and the rights which Congress extended to indivi-
duals through the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act. ' 217 Nothing
could be farther from the truth.
213. This is a common, although not exclusive, conflict of laws means by which
true conflicts between the laws of interested jurisdictions are resolved. See, e.g., RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 1-2 (1971).
214. W. CANY, AzmmucA INDrN LAW 173-74 (1988). One of the effects of this
proposition would be to essentially nullify certain sections of title 28 of the United
States Code. For example, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1988) requires federal courts to pay due
deference to tribal customs and laws but only if not inconsistent with state law. According
to the proposed FICA structure, this part of § 1360 would no longer be of any
consequence. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (1988) (jurisdiction of district courts would be
similarly affected).
215. See, e.g., Indian Jurisdiction, supra note 135.
Tribal judges, if they are Indian, usually attempt to settle disputes rather
than decide them .... This judicial attitude may reflect a tribal tradition
of resolving disputes by long discussion intended to achieve and maintain
harmony. From the viewpoint of an Indian litigant, the non-adversary
nature of tribal courts may be more comprehensible and less threatening
than the strict adversary proceeding of state [and federal] courts.
Id. at 217 (citations omitted).
216. S. 517, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CoNG Rnc. 2190 (1989).
217. Id. (comments of Sen. Hatch).
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First, Congress could not have extended rights to Indians
which they possibly already had, even without legislative action.
Second, true self-government for the tribes should mean, in
part, being able to refuse those "protections" which the federal
government has provided. The Hatch bill, however, gives the
"beneficiaries" of this law no choice.
The language of the Hatch bill takes Indians one step forward
and two steps back. It provides that "[iun any civil action
brought by an aggrieved individual, or by the Attorney General,
the Federal district court shall adopt the findings of fact of the
tribal court, if such findings have been made ... -218 Up to
this point, the bill sounds promising. In fact, it would not be
inconsistent with proposition six stated supra. This is due to the
fact that Indians are fully capable of determining for themselves
what should be required substantively and procedurally.
The last phrase would have read better if it said "when such
findings, if any, have been made .... " Such phraseology ac-
knowledges the uniqueness of Indian tribe dispute settlements.
Moreover, it is quite possible that a record of findings of fact
by tlhe tribal court is not in the tribe's tradition and is super-
fluous for settlement of the dispute.
At any rate, the language of the bill proceeds to dispel what-
ever hope there was for strengthening tribal self-government.
This is because the tribal findings of fact are adopted "unless
the district court determines that: (1) the tribal court was not
fully independent from the tribal legislative or executive au-
thority; . "..."-219 This proviso undoes the work of the preceding
phrase regarding tribal findings of fact, since many tribes do
not have, nor do they believe in, completely separate and in-
dependent judicial branches of government. For some, a har-
monious way of life means being involved in every aspect of
the tribal community. This translates into tribal legislative coun-
cils that may well be the "peacemakers" of the community too.
Thus, the requirement that a tribal court be "fully independent"
is unrealistic in view of the variety of tribal governmental struc-
tures, many of which are not fashioned after the Anglo model.
The Hatch bill would also deny a defense of tribal sovereign
immunity to those subject to the ICRA.m This provision too,
runs counter to proposition six, for the creation of a Federal
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immunity defense amounts to an overly broad articulation of
what should properly be a rule applied on a case-by-case basis.
Only by examining each unique tribe, its customs, its laws, its
treaties, and the particular facts of the case can anyone fairly
judge if sovereign immunity should apply.
Granted, section (d) of the Hatch bill requires that "whenever
a question of tribal law is at issue, [the federal court shall]
accord due deference to the interpretation of the tribal court of
tribal laws and customs."2' But the force of this mandate is
terribly weakened by the fact that the district court must conduct
a de novo review whenever one of the eight determinations
regarding findings of fact is made. The two mentioned here are
only by way of example. The remaining six are equally disin-
genuous.2
(7) The judges for the appellate panels should be elected for
life by the tribe's members with no requisite amount of Anglo
legal training. The seventh proposition is designed to obviate
charges of personal prejudice and bias exercised by some current
Indian judges. The requirement that judges be elected for life
also requires the corollary benefit of a lifetime pension for judges
upon their retirement, such cost to be borne by the federal
government. Federal responsibility for meeting these require-
ments would alleviate the problem of inadequate funding that
has hampered tribal courts since their inception. Thus, the fed-
eral government should no longer fund any of the tribal courts
with "what is commonly called 'soft money'-funding calculated
to run out after a year or two. Obviously, [that] approach
portends chaos in tribunal judicial systems."22
The training for FICA judges should be the equivalent of that
required of any other "peacemaker" within the tribe. No req-
221. Id.
222. E.g., tribal court findings will not be adopted if:
(2) the tribal court was not authorized to or did not finally determine
matters of law and fact;
(4) The tribal court failed to resolve the merits of the factual dispute;
(5) the tribal court employed a factfimding procedure not adequate to
afford a full and fair hearing;
(6) the tribal court did not adequately develop material facts;
(7) the tribal court failed to provide a full, fair, and adequate hearing;
or
(8) the factual determinations of the tribal court are not fairly supported
by the record ....
Id.
223. AMmuCAN INDIAN LAwYER TRAININO PROoRAM, INC., JusTaC IN INIAN COUN-
TRY 54 (C. Small ed. 1980).
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uisite amount of Anglo-American legal training should have to
be obtained in order to qualify as a FICA judge, though optional
training should be made available.
Using peacemakers without legal training raises one major
concern. Would the untrained peacemaker of one tribe be fit to
judge disputes originating from another tribe, whose traditions
and views may differ from his own? The best response to this
concern may simply be that by virtue of being Indian and being
respected by their own community as peacemakers, those Indians
on the panels will be capable of doing a better job than current
Anglo jurists. Certainly from an Indian perspective they could
not do much worse, judging from the dissatisfaction with the
existing system.
Additionally, if a tribal decision was in fact totally out of
step with established law and subsequently affirmed by the
FICA, the United States Supreme Court would have the power
of review. One might suggest that this check on the FICA would
provide the necessary balance in keeping Indian tribunals under
the federal supremacy umbrella while granting those tribunals a
substantial degree of self-governance.
(8) The judgments of the PICA should be respected, receiving
full faith and credit from all the states and other tribes. The
eighth proposition addresses the enforceability of tribal judg-
ments in state and federal courts. This proposition coincides
with the Supreme Court view that tribal court judgments "in
some circumstances" have already been regarded as entitled to
full faith and credit. 4 They are regarded as such due to the
realization that Indian tribes are not going to disappear. There-
fore, "it is necessary to begin to integrate tribal governments
into the permanent fabric of America. Extending full faith and
credit to Indian tribes is a starting point for institutionalizing
this process."' ' Such respect for Indian tribunal judgments
arguably is already due under 28 U.S.C. § 1738,26 but in all
likelihood a tribe is "higher" than a state227 and its judgments
24. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65 n.21 (1978). See also In re
Buehl, 87 Wash. 2d 649, 555 P.2d 1334 (1976).
225. Ragsdale, Problems in the Application of Full Faith and Credit for Indian
Tribes, 7 N.M.L. Rzv. 133, 142-43 (1977).
226. The full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution applies only
between states, but Congress now requires "the same full faith and credit in every court
withi the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or
usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken."
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982).
227. Native Am. Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959)
(characterizing tribes as "higher than states").
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thus deserve more deference than that accorded a territory.22
Congress, and not the Supreme Court, should be the branch
of government to extend full faith and credit to tribunal judg-
ments. Such delegation of authority would help avoid possible
confusion in attempting to rely on present inconsistent court
decisions. 9 In this way, judgments of Indian tribunals would
be given full effect, thereby providing enforcement beyond a
matter of mere comity.20
Another approach by which to bring the eighth proposition
to realization would be to amend the full faith and credit clause
of the U.S. Constitution. In doing so, there is less danger of
altering the Indians' "nation" status into "state" status. Since
Indians possess an acknowledged unique status in our legal
structure, it is fitting that a unique, hybrid amendment be
enacted which would treat tribes both as nations requiring com-
ity, and as entities requiring full faith and credit for their courts'
judgments be passed.
(9) The guiding principle of the FICA should be to assure
that tribal rights are upheld even when adverse to a federal
claim. Mere technical violations of federal law should not suffice
for Supreme Court review. The ninth proposition could easily
be considered the most important of all. It operates on the
premise that an Indian tribe is as close as a political entity can
be to existing as a foreign nation, without actually being one.
The premise adopts the view that, historically, Indian tribal
sovereignty was limited in only two respects: (a) the conveyance
of land, since the United States holds fee title; and (b) the ability
to make treaties or deal with a foreign power. Beyond these
two limitations, the tribes have remained in possession of their
sovereign powers. Thus, the appropriate resolution of most cases
on the merits should be at the trial level so that upon appeal
to the FICA, proper deference to the tribal courts will preclude
further litigation. 21 This allows an Indian tribe, as an inde-
228. See generally Ragsdale, supra note 225 (passim).
229. See, e.g., Jin v. CIT Financial Servs. Corp., 87 N.M. 362, 533 P.2d 751 (1975)
(Navajo reservation is a territory); Begay v. Miller, 70 Ariz. 380, 222 P.2d 624 (1950)
(Navajo divorce not entitled to full faith and credit).
230. Currently, the view of the Court is that exhaustion of Indian tribunal remedies
is required only as a matter of comity, not as a jurisdictional prerequisite. Iowa Mut.
Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 107 S. Ct. 971, 976 n.8 (1987).
231. See, e.g., id. at 978. The ninth proposition also implies, or at least should be
read to imply, that all avenues of tribal relief must be exhausted before FICA review
is permitted. The usual exceptions should be made available, i.e., exhaustion would be
futile or untimely. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 856-57 (1978).
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pendent government, and the tribe's members to decide for
themselves what rights the tribes must give them.2
32
Conclusion
"From time immemorial" is how some Indian tribes describe
their tenure on American soil.2 3 The phrase communicates well
the Indian notion that they have occupied the Americas for a
very long time. It is significant to note that during that entire
time, Indian tribes lived with a "harmony ethos" and its fun-
damental values of cooperation and sharing. Historians note
that "[tihis holistic view extended to the universe providing a
metaphysical explanation of time and space, essence and being.
From this perspective emerged the aboriginal sense of justice.' '234
It was this unique Indian perspective of their culture and
traditions with which the early Anglo-Americans came face to
face during the infancy of the United States and which was
virtually ignored by Justice Marshall in his now-famous "tril-
ogy" of Indian cases. On the other hand, Marshall's vision is
understandable given the socio-political climate of the times. But
understanding his vision also means realizing its injustice.
From Johnson v. M 'Intosh in 1823 to Iowa Mutual in 1987
the message from the federal government and courts, both state
and federal, to American Indians takes on a definite tone: You
may retain attributes of sovereignty and inherent powers of self-
governance, but you may only exercise those powers to the
extent that it does not affect a white man. This statement, as
we have seen, is substantiated by a multitude of examples rang-
ing from the noticeable lack of Presidential support for the
Cherokee Nation decision to the lack of understanding by the
court of Navajo customary law in Dodge v. Nakai.
Our lamentable treatment of Indians is traceable to the roots
of our own Eurocentric culture and its subsequent expression in
Anglo tribunals. Marshall was speaking on one level of under-
standing when he addressed the question of fee title to land,
while the Cherokee viewed the issue on an entirely different
level. But given that the trial was in a white man's court, white
man's rules dominated. This meant that there had to be a winner
and a loser.
Such would not have been the case had it been heard in a
tribal court. The goal in tribal court would have been to reach
232. See, e.g., S. PEvAR, THE Ria-s oF INDIANs AND Timus 207 (1983).
233. E.g., Oneida Indian Nation, supra note 155, at 664.
234. Indians and Criminal Justice, supra note 159, at 2.
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a solution agreeable to all parties, one that would help maintain
the peace. Not until modern times have we begun to see the
wisdom of that goal.25 It is because Indians have suffered a
unique experience of discrimination and injustice that they "speak
with a special voice to which we should listen." 6
Nowadays, we strive to save the environment because we
realize we are all interdependent on this earth: the people, the
oceans, the forests, Father Sky, and Mother Earth. From these
indications one might surmise that the Indian vision and the
white man's vision are on a path of convergence. Yet, given the
current mindset of Anglo-America, resistance to anything which
suggests control from or by anything other than Eurocentric
principles will not allow this convergence to materialize.
So how do we peacefully coexist, when one race of people is
operating on one metaphysical plane in community with nature
and solving problems according to the circumstance of the sit-
uation, while the other race operates on a worldly plane, solving
its problems using principles of individualized culpability and a
written set of strictly applied laws? The answer lies in the return
to the vision of the parties to the original treaties.
The Indians trusted our forefathers. Yet if it is true that great
nations, like great men, should keep their word, we have been
anything but great. The examples of our failings are many.
First, we essentially said to the Indians, "Don't attack us and
in return you may occupy a reservation with a federal protec-
tion." Then we said, "We'll protect you only if you move from
the land we let you occupy." Subsequent to removal we said,
"If you want federal protection and assistance, you've got to
be like us." Finally, we declared to the Indian, "You do not
legally exist anymore." Given our neurotic historical tendencies,
it is no wonder our system of justice is incomprehensible to the
American Indian.
A more practical method than interpreting original intent for
achieving coexistence between different cultures and traditions
235. See, e.g., S. O'BamN, A mCAN INDiAN TaLi GovErrNTS (1989) ("Today,
for example, arbitration is heralded by the legal establishment as a new and important
procedure for administering justice, but the process was long used by traditional [Indian]
tribal governments.") Id. at xi. See also Tornquist, Why Create a Dispute Resolution
Center?, 21 Wn.AEr L. REv. No.3, v (1985) In his introduction to a Dispute
Resolution Symposium, Professor Tornquist notes that "[decisions reached through the
adversary process are generally accurate and fair, but are circumscribed by the type of
remedy available. Courts can do little to solve the underlying social and psychological
causes of the dispute."
236. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22
H v. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323, 324 (1987).
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is to accommodate both of these cultures and perspectives. With
regard to American Indians, this is best done by formally ac-
knowledging the validity of the Indians' value system. Certainly
the Indians know, by definition, what they value in their culture.
Lest we be "Imperial Scholars," telling Indians what is best for
them, we should listen closely to their plea.
237
There is much we can learn from each other. Surely we could
have benefitted from dispute resolution techniques utilized suc-
cessfully by Indians even before Anglos set foot on this conti-
nent, and from an understanding and appreciation of what is
now termed the "Ecosystem."
In order to accommodate two distinct cultures, there must be
a formal mechanism to propagate their existence. A FICA would
be one facet of that mechanism. The central idea would be to
displace all notions of state and federal law supremacy within
an Indian reservation in order to maintain Indian sovereignty.
For example, if a tribal decision adversely affects non-Indians
as a result of an incident occurring on a reservation, respect for
the sovereignty of the tribes should honor the tribal ruling,
whatever it may be. That is part of the price of being a great
nation that keeps its word and respects the rights of others.
Allowing Indians to review decisions made by Indians would
create a new and distinct branch of the federal judiciary, an
area that should require Indian tribal law expertise for all prac-
titioners in the field. The idea of a FICA is consistent with the
original intent of our forefathers to treat Indians as a distinct,
sovereign people. Moreover, it is clear, as demonstrated by
Oliphant, National Farmers, Iowa Mutual, and similar cases,
that our current judicial structure can foster only one vision.
In order to coexist in a world where we see God as a spirit
to which we aspire and where the Indian sees himself in sacred
communion with the spirits, the least we can do as human beings
is respect our brothers' vision.
237. See Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights
Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 561, 566 (1984).
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